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Abstract
The increasing trend of embedding positioning capabilities (e.g., GPS) in
mobile devices has created unprecedented opportunities for the widespread
use of Location Based Services (LBS). Mobile users are able to formulate
spatial queries, such as “find the closest restaurant to my current position”.
For such applications to succeed, privacy and confidentiality are essential.
Commonly, privacy-enhancing techniques rely on encryption to safeguard
communication channels, and on pseudonyms to protect user identities.
Nevertheless, an LBS query contains the current location of the user, which
may be mapped to the user’s identity through a variety of means, such as
signal triangulation, or physical observation. Hiding the user location is a
challenging task, and a primordial requirement for LBS privacy.
This thesis presents a framework for private queries in location-based
services. First, we study in depth the location privacy problem in the context
of spatial K-anonymity (SKA), an extension of the K-anonymity paradigm,
widely used for privacy preservation in relational databases. To enforce
SKA, we adopt a three-tier architecture, with an Anonymizer Service (AS)
that acts as an intermediary between the users and the LBS, and anonymizes
queries by cloaking user locations. We identify the reciprocity property, a
sufficient condition to guarantee privacy for a snapshot of user locations,
and develop two SKA algorithms which provide a trade-off between privacy
requirements and query processing overhead. We also devise algorithms to
process range and nearest-neighbor anonymized queries at the LBS side.
Next, we extend our results by showing how reciprocity can be effectively
and efficiently enforced using hierarchical spatial indices, such as Quad-trees
and R-trees. We also develop a stronger version of reciprocity - frequency-
aware reciprocity - which addresses the scenario when an attacker possesses
additional background knowledge about the relative frequencies of issuing
queries among distinct users.
Most existing work in LBS query privacy assumes a centralized AS, which
must handle the frequent updates of user locations, as well as the overhead
of anonymizing queries. Furthermore, the AS is a single-point-of-attack,
and, if compromised, the privacy of all users is threatened. We address
these limitations by devising a decentralized architecture for LBS anony-
mization: users organize themselves into a P2P network, and cooperate to
anonymize queries. We propose two such P2P systems, which provide a
trade-off between privacy requirements and scalability.
Finally, we take a step further from the SKA paradigm, and propose a
novel LBS privacy approach, based on Private Information Retrieval (PIR).
PIR comprises of a two-party cryptography-based protocol that allows a
client to retrieve the desired information from a server, without the server
learning what information was requested. We show that PIR eliminates the
need to trust a third-party anonymizer, as well as other users. Furthermore,
since location information is encrypted (not just cloaked, as in the case of
spatial K -anonymity), this method is resilient to any type of location-based
attack. For instance, PIR-based privacy protects against correlation attacks
in the case of private continuous queries (i.e., a user asks the same query
from different locations at consecutive timestamps), a problem which has
not been efficiently solved yet within the SKA paradigm. The PIR approach
provides superior privacy, and incurs a reasonable overhead in practice.
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In recent years, mobile devices with positioning capabilities (e.g., GPS) have
gained tremendous popularity. Navigation systems are already widespread
in the automobile industry and, together with wireless communications, fa-
cilitate exciting new applications. General Motor’s OnStar system, for ex-
ample, supports on-line rerouting to avoid traffic jams and automatically
alerts the authorities in case of an accident. More applications based on the
users’ location are expected to emerge with the arrival of the latest gadgets
(e.g., iPAQ hw6515, Mio A701), which combine the functionality of a mo-
bile phone, PDA and GPS receiver. For such applications to succeed, the
privacy and confidentiality issues are of paramount importance.
Consider the example in Figure 1.1: Bob uses his GPS-enabled mobile
phone to find the nearest betting office. This query can be answered by a
Location Based Service (LBS) in a publicly available web server (e.g., Google
Maps). Since Bob does not want to disclose to Eve (an eavesdropper) his
gambling habits, instead of directly sending the query to the LBS, he uses
a pseudonym1 service, which is a trusted server (services for anonymous
web surfing are commonly available nowadays). He establishes a secure
connection (e.g., SSL) with the pseudonym service, which removes the user
id and forwards the query to the LBS. The answer from the LBS is also
routed to Bob through the pseudonym service.
Nevertheless, the query itself unintentionally reveals sensitive informa-
1http://www.torproject.org/
1
Figure 1.1: Hiding identity with pseudonyms is not sufficient
tion. In our example, the LBS requires the coordinates of the user in order to
process the nearest neighbor (NN) query. Since the LBS is not trusted, Eve
can collaborate with the LBS and acquire the location of Bob and his query
result (i.e., betting office). The next step is to relate the coordinates to a
specific user. Eve may choose from a variety of techniques such as physical
observation of Bob, triangulating his mobile phone’s signal2, or consulting
publicly available databases. If, for instance, Bob uses his phone within his
residence, Eve can easily convert the coordinates to a street address (most
on-line maps provide this service) and relate the address to Bob by accessing
an on-line white pages service.
A broad discussion on the risks of revealing sensitive information in
location-based services can be found in [16]. In practice, users would be
reluctant to access a service that may disclose their political/religious af-
filiations or alternative lifestyles. Furthermore, given that the LBS is not
trusted, users might be hesitant to ask innocuous queries such as “find the
closest gas station” or “which are the restaurants in my vicinity” since,
once their identity is revealed, they may face unsolicited advertisements,
e-coupons, etc.
To address these privacy threats, most existing solutions rely on the K -
anonymity [53, 58] paradigm, which has been used for publishing census
data and hospital records. A dataset is said to be K-anonymized, if each
2Phone companies can estimate the location of the user within 50-300 meters, as re-














Figure 1.2: Example: “Find the nearest hospital”.
record is indistinguishable from at least K − 1 other records with respect to
certain identifying attributes. In location based services, the corresponding
Spatial K-anonymity (SKA) concept translates as follows: given a query,
guarantee that an attack based on the query location cannot identify the
query source with probability larger than 1/K, among other K − 1 users.
Typically, users ask Range or Nearest-Neighbor (NN) queries with re-
spect to their location. For example, user u1 in Figure 1.2(left) (users are
shown as black dots), may ask: “Find the nearest hospital to my present
location” (the answer is h2). In order not to reveal his exact location, u1
employs the use of an Anonymizer Service (AS), which hides user locations.
Commonly, the three-tier architecture of Figure 1.3 is employed, where the
AS acts as an intermediate tier between the users and the LBS. Users send
their locations and queries to the centralized AS, through a secure connec-
tion. In our case, u1 sends to AS the query content (i.e. “find the closest
hospital”), and the required degree of anonymity K (note that, K is based
on individual privacy criteria, and may vary among queries). For each re-
ceived query, the anonymizer removes the id of the user, and constructs an
Anonymizing Spatial Region (ASR or K-ASR), which is an area that en-
closes the query source, as well as at least K − 1 other users. Continuing
the running example in Figure 1.2(right), upon receiving the query request
from u1, the AS identifies a set of additional two users (i.e., u2 and u3) and
3
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Figure 1.3: Framework for Spatial K -anonymity (SKA)
assembles the corresponding ASR.
The anonymizer then sends the ASR to the LBS, which cannot know
which of the enclosed users is the query source. The LBS returns to the
anonymizer a set of candidate results that satisfy the query condition for
any possible point in the ASR. This set includes all hospitals inside the ASR
(e.g., h3), as well as the NN of any point on the ASR perimeter [35]. In the
example, the result set consists of h2, h3 and h4. Note that, the number of
returned results, as well as the processing cost at the LBS, is dependent on
the spatial extent of the ASR; therefore, small ASRs are preferred.
The LBS may be compromised, or it may be malicious itself. Therefore,
in the worst case, an adversary may have complete knowledge of all K -
ASRs received by the LBS. An SKA method should provide privacy under
this scenario, as well.
Existing methods for spatial K -anonymity (reviewed in Chapter 2) have
at least one of the following shortcomings: (i) They compromise the query
issuer’s identity for certain user location distributions. In most cases, the
privacy of outliers is exposed. (ii) They sacrifice quality of service (QoS),
i.e., some queries must be delayed or dropped, in order to preserve user
privacy. (iii) They are ineffective, i.e., they generate large ASRs, resulting
in high query processing cost, and increased communication to transfer a
large number of candidate results from the LBS back to the AS. (iv) They
focus exclusively on cloaking mechanisms, and lack algorithms for query
processing at the LBS. We address all of these limitations, as described
next.
4
1.1 Contributions and Thesis Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we
give a background on LBS query privacy, and survey the related work in the
area. Subsequently, we introduce our specific contributions:
• In Chapter 3, we adopt the centralized anonymizer service architecture
of Figure 1.3, and address the LBS query privacy problem through a
comprehensive set of techniques. Specifically, we identify an important
property of ASRs, reciprocity, which is a sufficient condition to guar-
antee query privacy for a snapshot of user locations. Intuitively, reci-
procity requires that whenever user ui includes uj in its corresponding
ASR, uj also includes ui in its ASR when it issues a query. We propose
two cloaking algorithms: Nearest Neighbor Cloak and Hilbert Cloak .
Nearest Neighbor Cloak builds K -ASRs based on user proximity, and
significantly outperforms existing techniques in terms of K -ASR size.
On the other hand, Hilbert Cloak builds upon the reciprocity property,
and never reveals the query source, regardless of the user location dis-
tribution. Note that, Hilbert Cloak is the first technique in literature
to provide privacy guarantees for LBS queries.
Moreover, we address the issue of anonymized query processing at the
LBS. Specifically, we adopt an existing algorithm [35] to compute the k
nearest neighbors3 (kNN) of rectangular regions, as opposed to points.
We also investigate the use of K -ASRs with non-rectangular shape. In
particular, we consider circular-shape K -ASRs, and we develop a novel
algorithm to compute the kNN of circular regions. Our experiments
reveal that circular K -ASRs reduce the number of redundant results,
hence the communication cost between the anonymizer and the LBS.
• Existing work on LBS query privacy assumes that the attacker does not
have any prior knowledge on the frequency of issuing queries among
various users. However, this is not the case in practice. Users with
certain occupations may have a considerably higher frequency of is-
3Note that k, the number of nearest neighbors, is different from K , the degree of
anonymity.
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suing queries. For instance, a taxi driver, or a real estate agent, are
likely to issue many more daily queries than an office worker.
Revisiting the example of Figure 1.2, consider the 3−ASR enclosing
u1, u2 and u3 . If the attacker knows that the frequency of u1 issuing a
query is 2 times larger than that of either u2 or u3, then the probability
of identifying u1 as query source becomes 2/4 = 1/2 > 1/K for K =
3. Therefore, the privacy requirement of u1 is no longer met. In
Chapter 4, we address this scenario: we extend the reciprocity property
to account for variable query frequencies among users, and we propose
algorithms that preserve privacy even if the attacker possesses query
frequency knowledge.
Moreover, we give a general methodology to enforce the reciprocity
property (and its frequency-aware counterpart) using a generic spatial
index. Specifically, we propose methods to achieve reciprocity with
Quad-trees and R-trees. Such methods allow seamless integration of
query-privacy services with already existing applications, facilitating
the adoption of privacy-aware LBS.
• So far, we have focused on the centralized anonymizer service archi-
tecture. Nevertheless, such an approach has several shortcomings: the
centralized anonymizer is a bottleneck due to handling query requests,
frequent updates of user locations and result post-processing. Further-
more, the anonymizer represents a single point of attack: the complete
knowledge of the locations and queries of all users is a serious privacy
threat, if the anonymizer is compromised. Even if there is no attack,
the centralized anonymizer may be subject to governmental control,
and may be banned or forced to disclose sensitive user information
(similar to the legal case of the Napster file-sharing service).
In Chapter 5, we consider a distributed architecture for anonymous
location-based queries, which addresses the above-mentioned limita-
tions. Mobile users self-organize into a fault-tolerant, P2P overlay
network, and cooperate to assemble K -ASRs. We propose two such
protocols: (i) The Prive´ protocol implements the Hilbert Cloak ano-













Figure 1.4: PIR framework
network resembles a distributed B+-tree (each mobile user corresponds
to a data point), with additional annotation to support efficiently the
Hilbert-based K -ASR construction. Prive´ avoids the single point
of attack of the centralized AS, since the state of the system is dis-
tributed in numerous users. However, it may incur slow response time
at the high levels of the network tree, during peak load. (ii) Mo-
biHide is a scalable P2P anonymization system based on the Chord
[57] DHT. It uses a randomized version of Hilbert Cloak, which pre-
vents any hotspots in the system. MobiHide does not offer the same
theoretical privacy guarantees as Prive´, but it does provide strong
privacy in practice. Therefore, we propose two alternative solutions,
representing a clear trade-off between privacy and scalability.
• Finally, we move one step beyond the SKA paradigm, and devise a Pri-
vate Information Retrieval (PIR)-based solution to LBS query privacy.
SKA assumes the existence of a trusted third party anonymizer service,
as well as a large number of cooperating LBS users, who are willing
to constantly report their location to the AS. Furthermore, users are
assumed to be non-malicious, i.e. they do not collude against a target
user. Our proposed PIR framework relies on cryptographic techniques,
and relinquishes these assumptions: no trusted third-party (either AS
or mobile users) is required. Furthermore, no expensive maintenance
of locations for a large population of subscribed users is necessary.
Recent research on PIR [19, 42] resulted in protocols that allow a
client to privately retrieve information from a database, without the
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database server learning what particular information the client has re-
quested. Most techniques are expressed in a theoretical setting, where
the database is an n-bit binary string X (see Figure 1.4). The client
wants to find the value of the ith bit of X (i.e., Xi). To preserve
privacy, the client sends an encrypted request q(i) to the server. The
server responds with a value r(X, q(i)), which allows the client to com-
pute Xi. We focus on computational PIR, which relies on the fact that
it is computationally intractable for an attacker to find the value of i,
given q(i). Furthermore, the client can easily determine the value of
Xi based on the server’s response r(X, q(i)).
In Chapter 6, we extend existing PIR protocols for binary data to the
LBS domain, and we propose approximate and exact techniques to
privately answer NN queries. As opposed to SKA techniques, where
the user location is cloaked, but some location-information is still re-
vealed (i.e., the K -ASR area which encloses the query source), the PIR
approach does not disclose any spatial information whatsoever, since
location data is encrypted. Hence, the PIR method is resilient against
any type of location-based attack, including correlation attacks, which
can be staged when a user issues continuous queries (i.e. the same
query is asked at consecutive timestamps, from distinct locations).
Figure 1.5 provides a roadmap of the thesis.
This thesis contains work already accepted for publication, as well as
work currently under review. Specifically, Chapter 3 is based on the IEEE
TKDE article in [39]. The work in Chapter 4 is currently under review with
the VLDB Journal. The Prive´ and MobiHide P2P systems presented
in Chapter 5 have been published in the proceedings of the International
World Wide Web Conference (WWW) [29] and International Symposium
on Spatial and Temporal Databases (SSTD) [28], respectively. The work
in Chapter 6 is currently under review with the SIGMOD 2008 conference.
Furthermore, our research on LBS privacy has provided us with important
insights on the related problem of privacy in relational databases, resulting
in two other research papers (not included in this thesis, as their focus is not
on LBS privacy): a VLDB 2007 paper [30] which uses multi-to-1D mapping
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Figure 1.5: Thesis Roadmap
to anonymize relational data, and an ICDE 2008 paper [31], which addresses




This chapter provides background on the LBS query privacy problem, and
surveys existing LBS privacy techniques. In Section 2.1, we briefly discuss
the K -anonymity paradigm in relational databases, while in 2.2 we present
Spatial K -anonymity, and introduce its assumptions and objectives. In Sec-
tion 2.3, we survey existing SKA techniques, and highlight their limitations.
Section 2.4 focuses on processing of anonymized queries (i.e., ASRs) at the
LBS. In Section 2.5, we survey P2P techniques that are relevant to our dis-
tributed anonymization architecture of Chapter 5, whereas related work on
Private Information Retrieval is overviewed in Section 2.6.
2.1 K-anonymity
Extensive research efforts have focused on privacy-preserving publishing of
relational data. In this context, released microdata (e.g. detailed census
or medical records) should not be linked to specific individuals. Adam
and Wortmann [3] survey methods for computing aggregate functions (e.g.,
sum, count) under the condition that the results do not reveal any specific
record. Agrawal and Srikant [9] employ random perturbation to prevent re-
identification of records, by adding noise to the data. In [36], it is shown that
an attacker could filter the random noise, and hence breach data privacy,
unless the noise is correlated with the data. However, randomly perturbed
data is not “truthful” [45], in the sense that it contains records which do not
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exist in the original data. Furthermore, random perturbation may expose
privacy of outliers when an attacker has access to external knowledge.
Published microdata may contain quasi-identifier attributes (QID), such
as age, or zipcode, which may be joined with public databases (e.g. vot-
ing registration lists) to re-identify individual records. To address this
threat, Samarati and Sweeney [53, 58] introduced K -anonymity, a privacy-
preserving paradigm which requires each record to be indistinguishable among
at leastK−1 other records with respect to the set of QID attributes. Records
with identical QID values form an equivalence class, or anonymized group.
K -anonymity can be achieved through generalization, which maps detailed
attribute values to value ranges, and suppression, which removes certain
attribute values or records from the microdata. The process of data anony-
mization is called recoding, and it inadvertently results in information loss.
Several privacy-preserving techniques have been proposed, which attempt
to minimize information loss, i.e. maximize utility of the data.
Meyerson et al [48] proposed an approximate algorithm that minimizes
the number of suppressed quasi-identifier values; the approximation bound
is O(K · logK). Aggarwal et al [6] improved this bound to O(K), while Park
et al [52] further reduced it to O(logK).
More recent works adopt the generalization of quasi-identifiers. Bayardo
et al [12] and LeFevre et al [43] proposed optimal K -anonymity solutions for
single-dimensional recoding, which performs value mapping independently
for each attribute. LeFevre et al [44] introducedMondrian, an heuristic solu-
tion for multi-dimensional recoding, which performs mapping for the Carte-
sian product of multiple attributes. Mondrian outperforms optimal single-
dimensional solutions, due to its increased flexibility in forming anonymized
groups. Methods discussed so far perform global recoding, where a particu-
lar detailed value is always mapped to the same generalized value. In con-
trast, local recoding allows distinct mappings across different anonymized
groups. Clustering-based local recoding methods are proposed in [5, 66].
Xiao and Tao [64] consider the case where each individual requires a differ-
ent degree of anonymity, whereas Aggarwal [4] shows that anonymizing a
high-dimensional relation leads to unacceptable loss of information due to
the dimensionality curse.
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K -anonymity prevents re-identification of individual records, but it is
vulnerable to homogeneity attacks, where many (or all) of the records in
an anonymized group share the same sensitive attribute (SA) value. ` -
diversity [47] addresses this vulnerability, and creates anonymized groups
in which at least ` SA values are “well-represented”. Any K -anonymity
technique can be adapted to account for SA value diversity, by changing
the group validation condition. Nevertheless, K -anonymity techniques use
generalization or suppression, and may result in high information loss, espe-
cially for high-dimensional QID. Ghinita et al [30] employ multi-dimensional
to 1-D transformations to solve efficiently the K -anonymity and `-diversity
problems, while [31] presents a technique for privacy-preserving publication
of high-dimensional transaction (or “market-basket”) data.
Anatomy [63] introduced a novel approach to achieve `-diversity: instead
of generalizing QID values, it decouples the SA from its associated QID, and
permutes the SA values among records. Since QID are published directly,
the information loss is reduced. A similar approach is taken in [67].
t-closeness is another privacy paradigm introduced in [46], which at-
tempts to reproduce in each anonymized group the overall distribution of
SA values of the entire published table. However, the method proposed
to transform the dataset may incur high information loss in practice. Fi-
nally, Xiao and Tao [65] have proposed m-invariance, a privacy model for
publishing sequential data releases.
2.2 Spatial K -anonymity. Assumptions and Goals
In the LBS domain, K -anonymity was first introduced in [33]. Spatial K -
anonymity (SKA) prevents an attacker from learning exact user locations.
Given a query from user u, SKA techniques replace the exact location of u
with an Anonymizing Spatial Region (ASR or K -ASR) that encloses u, as
well as K − 1 other users. Formally:
Definition 2.1. [Spatial K-anonymity(SKA)] Let H be a set of K
distinct user entities with locations enclosed in an arbitrary spatial region
K-ASR. A user u ∈ H is said to possess K-anonymity with respect to K-
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ASR if the probability of distinguishing u among the other users in H does
not exceed 1/K. We refer to K as the required degree of anonymity.
Note that, SKA does not depend on the size of the K -ASR. In the
extreme case, the K -ASR can degenerate to a point, if K users are at the
same location. In general, we prefer small K -ASRs, in order to minimize
the processing cost at the LBS and the communication cost between the
LBS and the mobile user. Nevertheless, some applications may impose a
lower bound on the size of the K -ASR; for instance, it may be forbidden by
law to disclose exact user locations [16]. In such a case, the K -ASR can be
trivially enlarged to satisfy the lower bound, by symmetrical scaling in all
directions. The same procedure can also be used to avoid having users on
the perimeter of the K -ASR.
SKA is commonly performed by an Anonymizer Service (AS), or simply
anonymizer. The anonymizer is a trusted server, which collects the current
location of users and anonymizes their queries. Each query has a required
degree of anonymity K , which ranges between 1 (no privacy requirements)
and the user cardinality (maximum privacy). We assume that an attacker
has complete knowledge of (i) all the ASRs ever received at the LBS, (ii)
the cloaking algorithm used by the anonymizer, and (iii) the locations of all
users. The first assumption states that either the LBS is not trusted (e.g., a
commercial service that collects unauthorized information about its clients
for unsolicited advertisements), or the communication channel between the
anonymizer and the LBS is not secure. The second assumption is common in
the security literature since the data privacy algorithms are usually public.
The third assumption is motivated by the fact that users may often (or
always) issue queries from the same locations (home, office), which may be
easily identified through public databases, telephone directories, etc. Fur-
thermore, they may reveal their locations by issuing queries without privacy
requirements. In scenarios with highly mobile users, the attacker may not be
able to learn exact user locations. However, one can argue that in these cases
spatial K -anonymity is not important, because (i) the user ids are removed
by the anonymizer anyway, and (ii) a query at a random position does not
necessarily reveal information about the identity of the corresponding user.
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However, in practice, a determined attacker may be able to acquire (through
triangulation, public databases, physical observation, etc.) the locations of
at least a few users in the vicinity of the targeted victim.
Similar to existing work on SKA [21, 33, 49] we focus on snapshot queries,
where the attacker uses current data, but not historical information about
movement and behavior patterns of particular clients1 (e.g., a user often
asking a particular query at a certain location or time). We also assume
that the value of K is not subject to attacks since it is transferred from the
client to the anonymizer through a secure channel.
Given a query, the anonymizer removes the user id, applies cloaking
to hide the user’s location through an ASR, and forwards the ASR to the
LBS. The cloaking algorithm is said to preserve spatial K -anonymity, if the
probability of the attacker pinpointing the query source under the above
assumptions does not exceed 1/K .
Note that simply generating an ASR that includes K users is not suf-
ficient for spatial K -anonymity. Consider for instance, a na¨ıve algorithm,
called Center Cloak (CC ) in the sequel, which given a query from u, finds his
K − 1 closest users, and sets the ASR as the minimum bounding rectangle
(MBR) or circle (MBC) that encloses them. In fact, a similar technique is
proposed in [21] for anonymization in peer-to-peer systems, i.e., the K -ASR
contains the query issuing peer and its K − 1 nearest nodes. CC is likely
to disclose the location of u under the center-of-ASR attack. Specifically,
let indexu be the position of u in the sequence of users enclosed by the
K -ASR, sorted in ascending order of their distance from the center of the
K -ASR; for example, if indexu = 1, then u is the closest user to the center.
The center-of-ASR attack is successful if P [indexu = 1] > 1/K , i.e., if the
probability of u being the closest user to the center exceeds 1/K .
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the positions of u inside an MBR
enclosing its 9 NNs (for details of the experimental setting, see Section 3.6).
In most cases, u is close to the center of the 10-ASR (i.e., P [indexu = 1] >
1/10). Hence, an attacker with knowledge of the cloaking algorithm (as-
sumption ii) may easily pinpoint u as the query source. Note that, since the
1In Chapter 6 we present a technique which guarantees privacy for continuous queries















Figure 2.1: Distance from MBR center for Center Cloak (K=10)
MBR may enclose more than 10 users it is possible to get P [indexu = i] > 0
for i > 10. The dashed line in the graph corresponds to the “flat” index
distribution obtained by an ideal anonymization technique, which would
always generate 10-ASRs with exactly 10 users.
In addition to the preservation of spatial K -anonymity, we define the
following objectives of cloaking:
1. The generated ASR should be as small as possible.
2. The cloaking algorithm should not compromise the quality of service
(QoS).
3. The ASR should not reveal the exact location of any user.
Goal 1 is induced by the fact that a large ASR incurs higher processing
overhead (at the LBS) and network cost (for transferring a large number of
candidate results from the LBS to the anonymizer). In real-world services,
users may be charged depending on the overhead that the anonymization
requirements impose on the system. Note that, as long as the anonymity
requirements of the user are satisfied, the size of the ASR is irrelevant in
terms of K -anonymity. Goal 2 states that systems that delay or reject
service requests, such as Clique Cloak [27] (reviewed in Section 2.3), are
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unacceptable. In general, since temporal cloaking compromises QoS, we
focus our attention on spatial cloaking. Goal 3 ensures that the anonymizer
does not help the attacker obtain the locations of users through the cloaking
algorithm (although, as discussed before, he may obtain them through other
means). The disclosure of exact locations by a service is undesirable to most
users (independently of their queries), and in some cases forbidden by law.
As an example, consider that the anonymizer picks K − 1 random users
and sends K independent queries (including the real one) to the LBS. This
method achieves spatial K -anonymity, but reveals the exact locations of K
users. Furthermore, it has several efficiency problems: (i) depending on the
value of K , a potentially large number of locations are transmitted to the
LBS and (ii) the LBS has to process K independent queries and send back
all their results.
Let u be the user issuing a query. The proposed cloaking algorithms first
generate an anonymizing set (AS) that contains u and at least K − 1 users
in u’s vicinity. The ASR is an area that encloses all users in AS. Although
the ASR can have arbitrary shape, we use minimum bounding rectangles
(MBR) or circles (MBC) because they incur small network overhead (when
transmitted to the LBS) and facilitate query processing. Note that, in ad-
dition to AS, the ASR may enclose some additional users that fall in the
corresponding MBR or MBC.
2.3 Existing SKA Techniques
Most previous work on location-based services adopts the concept of K -
anonymity using the framework of Figure 1.3: a user sends his position,
query and K to the anonymizer, which removes the id of the user and trans-
forms his location through cloaking. The generated K -ASR is forwarded to
the LBS which processes it and returns a set of candidates, containing the
actual results and false hits. The first cloaking2 technique, called Interval
Cloak [33] is based on quadtrees. A quadtree [54] recursively partitions the
space into quadrants until the points in each quadrant fit in a page/node.
2Beresford and Stajano [15] introduce the concept of mix zone, which is similar to the
K -ASR, but do not provide concrete algorithms for spatial cloaking.
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Figure 2.2 shows the space partitioning and a simple quadtree assuming
that a node contains a single point. The anonymizer maintains a quadtree
with the locations of all users. Once it receives a query from a user U , it
traverses the quadtree (top-down) until it finds the quadrant that contains
U and fewer than K − 1 users. Then, it selects the parent of that quadrant




































Figure 2.2: Example of Interval Cloak and Casper
Assume that in Figure 2.2, U1 issues a query with K=2. Quadrant3
〈(0, 2), (1, 3)〉 contains only U1, so its parent 〈(0, 2), (2, 4)〉 becomes the 2-
ASR. Note that the ASR may contain more users than necessary; in this
example it includes U1, U2, U3, although 2 users would suffice for the privacy
requirements. A large ASR burdens the query processing cost at the LBS
and the network overhead for transferring a large number of candidate re-
sults from the LBS to the anonymizer. In order to overcome this problem,
Gruteser and Grunwald [33] combine temporal cloaking with spatial cloak-
ing, i.e., the query may wait until K (or more) objects fall in the user’s
quadrant. In our example, the query of U1 will be executed when a second
user enters 〈(0, 2), (1, 3)〉, in which case 〈(0, 2), (1, 3)〉 is the 2-ASR sent to
the LBS.
Similar to Interval Cloak , Casper [49] is based on quadtrees. The anony-
mizer uses a hash table on the user id pointing to the lowest-level quadrant
where the user lies. Thus, each user is located directly, without having
3We use the coordinates of the lower-left and upper-right points to denote a quadrant.
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to access the quadtree top-down. Furthermore, the quadtree can be adap-
tive, i.e., contain the minimum number of levels that satisfies the privacy
requirements. In Figure 2.2, for instance, the second level for quadrant
〈(0, 2), (2, 4)〉 is never used for K≥ 2 and can be omitted. The only differ-
ence in the cloaking algorithms of Casper and Interval Cloak is that Casper
(before using the parent node as the K -ASR) also considers the neighbor-
ing quadrants at the same level of the tree. Assume again that in Fig-
ure 2.2 U1 issues a query and K=2. Casper checks the content of quadrants
〈(1, 2), (2, 3)〉 and 〈(0, 3), (1, 4)〉. Since the first one contains user U3, the
2-ASR is set to 〈(0, 2), (2, 3)〉, which is half the size of the 2-ASR computed
by Interval Cloak (i.e., 〈(0, 2), (2, 4)〉).
However, Interval Cloak and Casper may compromise location anony-
mity in the presence of outliers. Consider the example of Figure 2.2 as-
suming that K= 2. If a query originates from U1, U2, or U3, the 2-ASR of
Interval Cloak is quadrant 〈(0, 2), (2, 4)〉. Similarly, the 2-ASR of Casper
is the concatenation of two sibling quadrants at level 2 (e.g., 〈(0, 2), (1, 3)〉
and 〈(1, 2), (2, 3)〉). On the other hand, if a query originates from U4, the
2-ASR is the entire data-space 〈(0, 0), (4, 4)〉) for both Interval Cloak and
Casper . Thus, an attacker can identify U4 for all 2-ASRs that cover the
entire data-space.
For illustration purposes, in the above examples we assumed that the
attacker knows K , although as discussed in Section 2.2, K is not subject
to attacks. Nevertheless, even for variable and unknown K , the presence of
outliers may compromise spatial anonymity. We demonstrate the problem
for Interval Cloak and Casper using Figure 2.3. There is a single user U1 in
quadrant 〈(0, 0), (1, 1)〉 and N−1 users in 〈(1, 1), (2, 2)〉, where N is the user
cardinality. Quadrant 〈(1, 1), (2, 2)〉 may be subdivided further, but this is
not important for our discussion. Each user has equal probability to issue a
query, and the degree of anonymity required by different queries distributes
uniformly in the range [1, N ]. The term event signifies the issuance of a query
with anonymity degree K at a random user U . Then, an ASR covering the
entire data space is generated by (i) a query originating from U1 and 2 ≤
K ≤ N (i.e., N − 1 events), or (ii) a query originating from another user














Figure 2.3: Location anonymity compromise in the presence of outliers
and has knowledge of the user distribution (assumption iii in Section 2.2),
then he concludes that it originated from U1 with probability 1/2. Thus,
the spatial anonymity of U1 is breached for all values K> 2.
In general, following a similar analysis, we show in Appendix A that,
if any two quadrants contain a different number of users, the location ano-
nymity is compromised (for all values of K exceeding a threshold) in the
quadrant containing the smaller number.
U1










Queries and ASR Graph
ASR for U   and U1 2
rectangle for U3
 
Figure 2.4: Example of Clique Cloak
In Clique Cloak [27], each query defines an axis-parallel rectangle whose
centroid lies at the user location and whose extents are ∆x,∆y. Figure 2.4
illustrates the rectangles of three queries located at U1, U2, U3, assuming that
they all have the same ∆x and ∆y. The anonymizer generates a graph where
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a vertex represents a query: two queries are connected if the corresponding
users fall in the rectangles of each other. Then, the graph is searched for
cliques of K vertices and the minimum bounding rectangle (MBR) of the
corresponding rectangles forms the ASR sent to the LBS. Continuing the
example of Figure 2.4, if K=2, U1 and U2 form a 2-clique and the MBR of
their respective rectangles is forwarded so that both queries are processed
together. On the other hand, U3 cannot be processed immediately, but
it has to wait until a new query (generating a 2-clique with U3) arrives.
Clique Cloak allows users to specify a temporal interval ∆t such that, if a
clique cannot be found within ∆t, the query is rejected. The selection of
appropriate values for ∆x,∆y,∆t is not discussed in [27].
Chow and Mobkel [20] identified, independently from our work, the K-
sharing property, which is similar to the reciprocity that we propose4 in
Chapter 3. The authors of [20] also consider an extension of K-sharing,
which aims to prevent correlation attacks, i.e. attacks based on history
of user movement. If a user issues a continuous query, i.e. a sequence
of shapshot queries from different locations at consecutive timestamps, the
attacker can corroborate information from all snapshots to infer the query
source. [20] protects against correlation attacks as follows: At the initial
timestamp t0, it builds ASR0, which encloses a set AS of at least K users.
At a subsequent timestamp ti, the algorithm computes a new anonymizing
region ASRi that encloses the same users in AS, but contains their locations
at timestamp ti. There are two drawbacks: (i) As users move, the resulting
CR can grow very large, leading to prohibitive query cost. (ii) If a user in
AS disconnects from the service, the query must be dropped.
Location anonymity has also been studied in the context of related prob-
lems. Probabilistic Cloaking [18] preserves the privacy of locations with-
out applying spatial K -anonymity. Instead, (i) the ASR is a closed region
around the query point, which is independent of the number of users inside
and (ii) the location of the query is uniformly distributed in the ASR. Given
an ASR, the LBS returns the probability that each candidate result satisfies
the query, based on its location with respect to the ASR. Kamat et al. [40]
4Note that, our work in [29] pre-dates the work in [20], therefore the reciprocity prop-
erty that we propose is the first work to provide privacy guarantees
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propose a model for sensor networks and examine the privacy characteris-
tics of different sensor routing protocols. Hoh and Gruteser [34] describe
techniques for hiding the trajectory of users in applications that continu-
ously collect location samples. Chow et al. [21] study spatial cloaking in
peer-to-peer systems.
An encryption-based approach is considered in [41]: In a preprocessing
phase, a trusted third party transforms (using 2-D to 1-D mapping) and
encrypts the database. The database is then uploaded to the LBS, which
does not know the decryption key. All users possess tamper-resistant devices
which store the decryption key, but they do not know the key themselves.
Users send encrypted queries to the LBS and decrypt the answers to extract
the results. The method assumes that none of the tamper-resistant devices
is compromised. If this condition is violated, the privacy of all users can be
compromised. Moreover, there is no guarantee against correlation attacks,
in which an attacker combines information from multiple queries issued by
the same user from distinct locations.
2.4 Related Spatial Query Processing Techniques
The LBS maintains the locations of points-of-interest and answers cloaked
queries. The most common spatial queries, and the focus of the existing
systems, are ranges and nearest neighbors (NN). While the cloaking mecha-
nism at the anonymizer is independent of the query type, query processing
at the LBS depends on the query. Range queries are usually straightforward;
assume that a user U wants to retrieve the data objects within distance d
from his current location. Instead of the position of U , the LBS receives
(from the anonymizer), an ASR that contains U (as well as several other
users) and d. In order to compute the candidate results, the LBS extends
the ASR by d in all dimensions and searches for all objects in the extended
ASR. The set of candidates is returned to the anonymizer which filters out
false hits and returns the actual result to U .
The processing of NN queries is more complicated. If the ASR is an
axis-parallel rectangle (as in Interval Cloak , Casper and Clique Cloak), then
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(b) After the discovery of p3
Figure 2.5: Example of continuous NN search
[35], which finds the NN of any point inside a rectangular range. Assume
the example of Figure 1.2(right). The LBS must return the NN of every
possible location in the ASR. Such candidate data points lie inside (e.g.,
h3), or outside the ASR (e.g., h2, h4). For instance, h4 would be the NN for
user u3, or another user situated at the top-right corner of the ASR.
Figure 2.5 shows an example of the application of range nearest neighbor
search for three points of interest stored at the LBS, denoted by p1 . . . p3.
The initial set of candidates contains all points (p1, p2) inside the input range
(i.e., the ASR). Then, four continuous NN (CNN) queries [60], one for each
side of the ASR, retrieve the remaining candidates. Consider, for instance,
the CNN query for the bottom side se. The initial candidates split se into
two intervals: ss1 and s1e, where s1 is the point where the perpendicular
bisector of p1p2 intersects se. Currently, the NN of every point in ss1 is
p1, whereas the NN of every point in s1e is p2. The three vicinity circles
in Figure 2.5a, are centered at s, s1, e and their radii equal the distances
between s and p1, s1 and p1 (or p2), and e and p2, respectively. The only
data points that can be closer to se (than p1 and p2) must fall inside some
vicinity circle.
Continuing the example, p3 falls inside the last two vicinity circles and
updates the result as shown in Figure 2.5b. Specifically, s′1 is the point where
the perpendicular bisector of p1p3 intersects se: p1 becomes the NN of every
point in ss′1, and p3 the NN of every point in s′1e. Note that the vicinity
circles shrink as new data points are discovered. The process terminates
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when no more points are found within the vicinity circles. It can be shown
[35] that four CNN queries for the four sides of the ASR find all candidate
objects. A similar technique (also for rectangular ranges) is presented for
Casper in [49]; in Section 3.5, we develop a method capable of processing
circular ranges.
2.5 Related P2P Systems
In Chapter 5, we will introduce two P2P protocols for distributed anony-
mization of LBS queries. We further give a brief overview of the most
prominent P2P systems related to our work.
Key and range search has been studied extensively in distributed envi-
ronments. Several structured Peer-to-Peer systems (e.g, Chord [57]) support
distributed key search with O(logN) complexity. The drawback of such sys-
tems is that they cannot support efficiently node annotation. Without node
annotation, the communication cost for satisfying the reciprocity property
(which guarantees K -anonymity) is O(N); this cost is too high for large scale
systems. Closer to our work is the P-tree [22], which supports range queries
by embedding a B+-tree on top of an overlay network. No global index
is maintained; instead each node maintains its own B+-tree-like structure.
BATON [38] also addresses range queries, by embedding a balanced tree
onto an overlay network. It uses additional cross-links to prevent hotspots,
and achieves O(logN) complexity for search and maintenance. Similar to
Chord, these systems cannot support efficiently node annotation.
Hierarchical clustering in distributed environments has been an active
research topic in recent years. In [11], a hierarchical-clustering routing pro-
tocol for wireless networks is presented. The NICE project [10] proposes a
scalable application-layer multicast protocol, based on delivery trees built
on top of a hierarchically connected control topology. Nodes participating in
a multicast group are organized into a multi-layer hierarchy of clusters with
bounded size. NICE trees obtain delays in the order of O(logN), where N
is the size of the multicast group, and there is an upper bound of O(logN)
in terms of control state maintained per node. Our protocols also use hi-
erarchical clustering of mobile users, but the requirements of total ordering
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and annotation impose particular challenges that have not been addressed
by existing research.
2.6 Private Information Retrieval
In Chapter 6, we develop an LBS privacy solution that relies on Private
Information Retrieval (PIR). Our work builds on the theoretical results for
the PIR problem, which is defined as follows: a server S holds a database
with n bits, X = (X1 . . . Xn). A user u has a particular index i and wishes
to retrieve the value of Xi, without disclosing to S the value of i. The PIR
concept was introduced by Chor et al [19] in an information theoretic setting,
requiring that even if S had infinite computational power, it could not find
i. In this context it was proved that in any solution with a single server,
u must receive the entire database (i.e., O(n) cost). The communication
cost can be reduced to nO(
log logK
K logK
) if the database is replicated in K non-
colluding servers [14]. Nevertheless, in practice, it is sufficient to ensure that
S cannot find i with polynomial-time computations; this problem is known
as Computational PIR. Kushilevitz et al [42] showed that the communication
cost for a single server is O(nε), where ε is an arbitrarily small positive
constant. Our work employs Computational PIR.
Several approaches employ cryptographic techniques to privately answer
NN queries in relational data. Most of them are based on some version of the
secure multiparty computation problem [32]. Let two parties A and B hold
objects a and b, respectively. They want to compute a function f(a, b) with-
out A learning anything about B and vice versa. They encrypt their objects
using random keys and follow a protocol, which results into two “shares”
SA and SB given to A and B, respectively. By combining their shares, they
compute the value of f . In contrast to our problem (which hides the query-
ing user from the LBS), existing NN techniques assume that the query is
public, whereas the database is partitioned into several servers, neither of
which wants to reveal their data to the others. [62] assumes vertically parti-
tioned data and uses secure multiparty computation to implement a private
version of Fagin’s [24] algorithm. [55] follows a similar approach, but data is
horizontally partitioned among the servers. The computation cost is O(n2)
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and may be prohibitive in practice. [7] also assumes horizontally partitioned
data, but focuses on top-k queries.
More relevant to our problem is the work of [37] which uses PIR to
compute the NN of a query point. The server does not learn the query
point and the user does not learn anything more than the NN. To achieve
this, the method computes private approximations of the Euclidean distance
by adapting an algorithm [25] that approximates the Hamming distance in
{0, 1}d space (d is the dimensionality). The cost of [37] is O˜(n2) for the
exact NN and O˜(
√
n) for an approximation through sampling. The paper
is mostly of theoretical interest, since the O˜ notation hides polylogarithmic
factors that may affect the cost; the authors do not provide any experimental
evaluation of the algorithms.
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Chapter 3
SKA Framework for LBS
Privacy
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents our comprehensive SKA framework for LBS query
privacy. Our framework includes techniques for generating K -ASRs at the
anonymizer, as well as algorithms to process transformed queries at the
LBS. Similar to existing SKA work, we consider a centralized architecture1,
with an intermediate AS server between the mobile users and the LBS (see
Figure 1.3). Furthermore, we assume that an attacker does not have a priori
knowledge of the user query frequencies (i.e., a query may originate from
any user with equal probability). We remove this assumption in Chapter 4.
In Section 3.2 we propose the Nearest Neighbor Cloak cloaking technique,
which clearly outperforms existing methods in terms of K -ASR size. Sec-
tion 3.3 introduces the reciprocity concept, a sufficient condition to achieve
privacy, based on which, in Section 3.4, we propose the Hilbert Cloak al-
gorithm. In Section 3.5 we focus on anonymized query processing at the
LBS.
1Later in Chapter 5 we remove the centralized AS, and propose a decentralized solution
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3.2 Nearest Neighbor Cloak
Nearest Neighbor Cloak (NNC ) is a randomized variant of Center Cloak
(presented in Section 2.2), and is not vulnerable to center-of-ASR attacks.
Given a query from U , NNC first determines the set S0 containing U and
his K -1 nearest users. Then, it selects a random user Ui from S0 (the
probability of selecting the initial user U is 1/K ) and computes the set
S1, which includes Ui and his K -1 nearest neighbors (NNs). Finally, NNC
obtains S2 = S1 ∪U , i.e., S2 corresponds to the anonymizing set. This step
is essential, since U is not necessarily among the NNs of Ui. The K -ASR is
the MBR or MBC enclosing all users in S2.
Example 3.1. Figure 3.1 shows an example of NNC , where U1 issues a
query with K=3. The 2 NNs of U1 are U2, U3, and S0 = {U1, U2, U3}. NNC
randomly chooses U3 and issues a 2-NN query, forming S1 = {U3, U4, U5}.
The 3-ASR is the MBR enclosing S2 = {U1, U3, U4, U5}. NNC can be used
with variable values of K . It is not vulnerable to the center-of-ASR attack
since the probability of U being near the center of the K -ASR is at most 1/K
(due to the random choice). Furthermore, as we show in the experimental
evaluation of Section 3.6, the ASR is much smaller than that of Interval

























Figure 3.1: Example of NNC
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However, NNC , as well as Interval Cloak and Casper , may compromise
location anonymity in the presence of outliers. Consider that in Figure 3.1,
an adversary knows the locations of the users and the value of K . Then, he
can be sure that the query originated from U1 because if it were issued by
any other user (U3, U4, U5) in the 3-ASR, the ASR would not contain U1.
Next, we introduce the reciprocity principle, which is sufficient to guarantee
query privacy, regardless of user location distribution.
3.3 Reciprocity
We identify the following property that is sufficient for a K -ASR construc-
tion technique in order to preserve user privacy:
Definition 3.2. [K-ASR Reciprocity] Consider a user uq issuing a query
and its associated K-ASR Aq. Aq satisfies the reciprocity property iff there
exists a set of users AS lying inside Aq such that (i) |AS| ≥ K, (ii) uq ∈ AS
and (iii) every user u ∈ AS lies in the K-ASRs of all other users in AS.
Example 3.3. Fig. 3.2 shows an example with ten users. For K=5,
the K -ASR of users u1, u3, u4, u8, u10 is area A1 and the K-ASR of users
u2, u5, u6, u7, u9 is areaA2. In this example, ASRs of all users satisfy the reci-
procity property. For instance, for user u1, if we setAS = {u1, u3, u4, u8, u10},
we may easily verify that AS satisfies all the requirements of the reciprocity
property.
Figure 3.2: K -ASR Reciprocity Example, K=5
Theorem 3.4. For a given snapshot of user locations, and regardless of the
query distribution among users, a K-ASR construction technique guaran-
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tees spatial K-anonymity if every generated K-ASR satisfies the reciprocity
property.
Proof. We assume the worst case scenario, where an attacker knows the
exact location of all users in the system (from an outside source). The
attacker possesses a set A of K -ASRs associated to user queries.
Consider K -ASR Aq ∈ A. The attacker attempts to infer the user uq
that constructed Aq. Since Aq satisfies the reciprocity property, there exists
a set of users AS (lying inside Aq) such that (i) |AS| ≥ K, (ii) uq ∈ AS
and (iii) every user u ∈ AS lies on the K -ASRs of all other users in AS.
Moreover, since every K -ASR satisfies the reciprocity property, it follows
that when the attacker inspects any K -ASR that includes uq, he will observe
the same set of users AS. Therefore, for all users u in AS, the probability
Pu of being the query issuer is:





Hence, the K -anonymity property is satisfied.
In general, Interval Cloak , Casper and NNC do not satisfy reciprocity
as they violate condition (iii). For instance, in the example of Figure 2.3,
although users U2 . . . UN lie in the K -ASR of U1, U1 is not in the K -ASR of
U2 . . . UN for 2 ≤K< N . Similarly for NNC , although in Figure 3.1 U3 . . . U5
are in the 3-ASR of U1, U1 is not in the 3-ASR of U3 . . . U5.
In view of this property, an optimal K -ASR construction algorithm
would partition the user population into K -ASRs that possess the reci-
procity property, such that the sum of areas of the resulting K -ASRs is
minimized. However, finding this optimal K -anonymity solution, which is
similar to finding the optimal K-anonymous generalization of a dataset, is
an NP-Hard problem [48]. Next, we introduce an efficient algorithm that en-
forces reciprocity, and at the same time generates K -ASRs with low spatial
extent.
3.4 Hilbert Cloak
Hilbert Cloak(HC ) uses the Hilbert space-filling curve [50] to generate small
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(but not necessarily optimal) ASRs for variable values of K . The Hilbert
space filling curve transforms the 2-D coordinates of each user into a 1-D
value H(U). Figure 3.3 illustrates the Hilbert curves for a 2-D space using
a 4 × 4 and 8 × 8 space partitioning. With high probability [50], if two
points are in close proximity in the 2-D space, they will also be close in
the 1-D transformation. A major benefit of Hilbert (and similar) curves,
is that they permit the indexing of multidimensional objects through one-










Figure 3.3: Hilbert Curve (left: 4× 4, right: 8× 8)
Given a query from user U with anonymity requirement K , HC sorts the
Hilbert values and splits them into K -buckets. Each K -bucket has exactly
K users, except the last one which may contain up to 2·K -1 users. Let H(U)
be the Hilbert value of U and rankU be the position of H(U) in the sorted
sequence of all locations. HC identifies the K -bucket containing rankU .
The users in that K -bucket constitute the corresponding AS. Figure 3.4
illustrates an example, where the user ids indicate their Hilbert order. For
K=3, the users are grouped into 3 buckets (the last one contains 4 users).
When any of U1, U2 or U3 issues a query, HC returns the first bucket (shown
shaded) as the AS; the MBR (or MBC) of that bucket becomes the 3-ASR.
HC is reciprocal because all users in the same bucket share the same K -
ASR; therefore, it guarantees spatial anonymity according to Theorem 3.4.
Furthermore, it can deal with variable values of K by not physically storing
the K -buckets. Instead, it maintains a balanced sorting tree, which indexes
the Hilbert values. When a user U initiates a query with anonymity degree























Figure 3.4: Example of Hilbert Cloak
rankU , we calculate the start and end positions defining the K -bucket that
includes H(U), as follows:
start = rankU − (rankU mod K), end = start+K − 1 (3.1)
The complexity of the in-order tree traversal is O(N), where N is the
number of indexed users. To compute rankU efficiently, we use an aggregate
tree [59], where each node w stores the number wcount of nodes in its left
subtree (including itself). Using this data structure, rankU is calculated
in O(logN) as follows: we initialize rankU to zero and perform a normal
lookup for H(U). For every node w we visit, we add wcount to rankU only if
we follow a right-hand branch. The complexity of maintaining the aggregate
information is O(logN) because changes are propagated from the leaves to
the root. Since the complexity of constructing the K -ASR is O(logN +K),
whereas search, insert and delete cost O(logN), the data structure is scal-
able. Therefore, HC is applicable to a large number of mobile users who
update their location frequently and have varying requirements for the de-
gree of anonymity. Note that, while our description assumes a main memory
index, the technique can be easily extended to secondary memory by using
B+-trees (we address ASR construction with various disk-based index struc-
tures in Chapter 4).
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3.5 Location-Based Service Query Processing
The Location-Based Service (LBS) receives the query from the anonymizer,
processes it and sends the results back to the anonymizer. In our implemen-
tation, the data in the LBS are indexed by an R*-Tree [13]; our methods,
however, are independent of the index structure. We support two types of
queries:
1. Range queries: The LBS receives the query range which is either an
axis-parallel rectangle R or a circle C. Processing is straight-forward;
the R-tree is traversed from the root to the leaves and any object inside
R (or C) is returned.
2. kNN queries: This case is more complex, since the LBS must find the k
nearest neighbors of the entire range. For rectangular ranges, we adopt
the Range Nearest Neighbor (RkNN) algorithm [35] (see Section 2.4
for details). The rest of this section describes our CkNN algorithm,
which computes the kNNs of circular ranges.
3.5.1 CkNN - Circular Range kNN
Similar to rectangular ranges [35], the set of kNNs of a circular range C also
consists of two subsets of objects: (i) all the objects inside C and (ii) the
kNNs of the circumference of C. The objects in (i) are retrieved by a range
query; in the rest of the section, we present the novel CkNN-Circ algorithm
which computes the kNNs of the circumference of C. Intuitively CkNN-Circ
is similar to CNN (see Section 2.4). However, some of the properties of 1-D
shapes which are used in CNN (e.g., continuity by the definition of [60]) do
not hold for 2-D shapes, rendering the problem more complex.
Conceptually, CkNN-Circ partitions the circumference of C into disjoint
arcs, and associates to each arc the data objects nearest to it. Consider the
example of Figure 3.5, where p1, p2 and p3 are the data objects. Let s0, s1
be the intersection points of the perpendicular bisector of p1p2 (denoted by
⊥p1p2) with C, i.e., |p1s0| = |s0p2| and |p1s1| = |s1p2|. Assuming that the
center c of C is the origin of the coordinate system, the polar coordinates of
s0 are (r, sˆ0), where r is the radius of C and sˆ0 is the (anti-clockwise) angle
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between the x-axis and the vector ~cs0. Similarly, the polar coordinates of
s1 are (r, sˆ1). The NN of every point in the arc [sˆ0, sˆ1] is p1; we denote this
as: [sˆ0, sˆ1] → p1. Likewise [sˆ1, sˆ0] → p2, since any point in the arc [sˆ1, sˆ0]
is closer to p2 than to any other object. Therefore, the set of NNs of C is
{p1, p2}. Note that p3 is not in this set, even though it is closer to C than






Figure 3.5: The 1-NNs of C are p1 and p2
Let D = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} be the set of all data objects. CkNN-Circ main-
tains a list SL of mappings [a, b]→ pi, where a, b are angles defining an arc
on C, 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 2pi, and pi ∈ D is the object which is closest to every
point of arc [a, b] than any other object pj ∈ D. The CkNN-Circ pseudocode
is shown in Figure 3.8.
In the example of Figure 3.6a, let p1 ∈ D be the first object encountered
by the algorithm. Since SL is initially empty, p1 is closest to the entire C.
Without loss of generality, we pick two points s0, s′0 ∈ C, where sˆ0 = 0 and
sˆ′0 = 2pi (i.e., they are the same point), and insert the mapping [sˆ0, sˆ′0]→ p1
into SL (line 2 of the pseudocode). For each subsequent point p ∈ D, the
algorithm traverses SL (line 4) and examines all existing mappings [a, b]→
q. There are three possible cases:
Case 1: ⊥pq∩C= ∅ or ⊥pq is tangent to C (lines 5-6). This case is
exemplified2 in Figure 3.6b. The only existing mapping is [sˆ0, sˆ′0]→ p1, and
p2 is processed next. Any point on the right-hand side of ⊥p1p2, is closer
to p1. Therefore, the entire C is closer to p1 than to p2. Since the mapping
to p1 already exists, there is no change in SL. Furthermore, even if there















Figure 3.6: CkNN example: perpendicular bisector does not intersect C
were more mappings inside SL, it would not be necessary to compare with
p2, since p1 covers p2. On the other hand, if p2 was at the right-hand side
(and p1 on the left), then p2 would be closer to C than p1. In this case, the
algorithm would remove the [sˆ0, sˆ′0]→ p1 mapping from SL and add a new
one [sˆ0, sˆ′0]→ p2 (line 6).
Case 2: ⊥pq∩C= {s0, s1} and either sˆ0 ∈ [a, b] or sˆ1 ∈ [a, b] (lines 12-
14). This case is illustrated in Figure 3.7a: both p1 and p2 have already been
processed, and there are two mappings in SL: [sˆ1, sˆ′1]→ p1 and [sˆ′1, sˆ1]→ p2.
Let p3 be the next object to be processed. p3 is compared against the existing
mappings. For the first one (i.e., [sˆ1, sˆ′1]→ p1), ⊥p1p3 intersects C at s2 and
s′2. Note that sˆ′2 6∈ [sˆ1, sˆ′1], so it is not considered further. On the other
hand, sˆ2 ∈ [sˆ1, sˆ′1] and p3 is closer to s1 than p1. Therefore (line 13), the arc
is split into two parts [sˆ1, sˆ2] and [sˆ2, sˆ′1], which are assigned to p3 and p1,
respectively. Similarly, for the second mapping (i.e., [sˆ′1, sˆ1] → p2), ⊥p2p3
intersects C at s3, s′3. Only sˆ3 ∈ [sˆ′1, sˆ1], so the arc is split into [sˆ′1, sˆ3]
and [sˆ3, sˆ1], which are assigned to p2 and p3, respectively. After updating,
SL = {[sˆ2, sˆ′1] → p1, [sˆ′1, sˆ3] → p2, [sˆ3, sˆ1] → p3, [sˆ1, sˆ2] → p3}. The last two
mappings can be combined (i.e., [sˆ3, sˆ2] → p3) since they are consecutive
and are mapped to the same object.
Case 3: ⊥pq∩C= {s0, s1} and both sˆ0, sˆ1 ∈ [a, b] (lines 9-11). This
case is illustrated in Figure 3.7b: again, both p1 and p2 have already been
processed, and SL = {[sˆ′1, sˆ1] → p1, [sˆ1, sˆ′1] → p2}. Next, p3 is com-
pared to the first mapping of SL. Note that ⊥p1p3 intersects C at s′2,




















Figure 3.7: The perpendicular bisector intersects C
parts and since p3 is closer to s′1 than p1 the corresponding mappings are:
[sˆ′1, sˆ′2] → p3, [sˆ′2, sˆ2] → p1, [sˆ2, sˆ1] → p3. Similarly, after considering ⊥p2p3,
[sˆ1, sˆ′1] is also split into three parts. Finally, after combining the consecutive
mappings, SL = {[sˆ′2, sˆ2]→ p1, [sˆ2, sˆ3]→ p3, [sˆ3, sˆ′3]→ p2, [sˆ′3, sˆ′2]→ p3}.
For simplicity, the pseudocode of Figure 3.8 computes only the 1-NNs.
To compute the kNNs, instead of a single object, the arcs in our imple-
mentation are mapped to an ordered list of k objects: [a, b] → (p1, . . . , pk),
where p1 is the nearest neighbor of arc [a, b], p2 is the second NN of arc
[a, b], etc. The procedure is called for each position i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) of the
ordered list. In the ith call, if an object p ∈ D already exists in position j
(1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1), then p is not considered for that mapping. Also, if an arc is
split, the objects in positions 1 . . . i−1 (i.e. the i−1 nearest neighbors found
already) are not altered. The worst case complexity of CkNN is O(|D|k),
since any object may cause an arc split. In practice, however, the algorithm
is faster, because the objects which are far away from C do not cause splits.
3.5.2 R-trees and CkNN
In order to use the CkNN algorithm with an R-tree, we employ a branch-
and-bound heuristic. Starting from the root, the R-tree is traversed either
in Depth-First or in Best-First [60] manner. When a leaf entry (i.e., object)
p is encountered, the CkNN algorithm is used to check whether p is closer
to C than any of the objects in the current mappings (i.e., p is a qualifying
object) and updates SL accordingly. For an intermediate entry E we avoid
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CkNN-Circ(D: the set of objects)
1. for every object p ∈ D do
2. if SL = ∅ then SL := {[0, 2pi]→ p}
3. else
4. for every interval ϕ ≡ [a, b]→ q, ϕ ∈ SL do
5. if ⊥pq∩ C= ∅ or ⊥pq is tangent to C then
6. if |pC| < |qC| then SL := (SL− ϕ) ∪ {[a, b]→ p}
else break
7. else
8. let s0, s1 be two points such that ⊥pq∩ C= {s0, s1}
9. if sˆ0 ∈ [a, b] and sˆ1 ∈ [a, b] then
// Assume sˆ0 < sˆ1 (the other case is symmetric)
10. if |pCa| < |qCa| then SL := (SL− ϕ)∪
∪{[a, sˆ0]→ p, [sˆ0, sˆ1]→ q, [sˆ1, b]→ p}
// Ca, Cb are the endpoints of arc [a, b]
11. else SL := (SL− ϕ)∪
∪{[a, sˆ0]→ q, [sˆ0, sˆ1]→ p, [sˆ1, b]→ q}
12. else if sˆ0 ∈ [a, b] or sˆ1 ∈ [a, b] then
// Let only sˆ0 ∈ [a, b] (sˆ1 ∈ [a, b] is symmetric)
13. if |pCa| < |qCa| then SL := (SL− ϕ)∪
∪{[a, sˆ0]→ p, [sˆ0, b]→ q}
14. else SL := (SL− ϕ) ∪ {[a, sˆ0]→ q, [sˆ0, b]→ p}
15. else if |pCa| < |qCa| then
SL := (SL− ϕ) ∪ {[a, b]→ p}
16. return SL
CkNN(D: the set of objects)
1. call CkNN-Circ(D)
2. return {p : p ∈ D ∧ p is inside C}∪
∪{p : p belongs to a mapping of SL}
Figure 3.8: Find the 1-NNs of a circular range C
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visiting its subtree if it is impossible to contain any qualifying object.
Figure 3.9 presents an example where p1 and p2 are the current 1-NNs of
C. Next, an entry E from an intermediate node of the R-tree is encountered.
We observe the following:
Lemma 3.5. Let MBRE be an axis-parallel MBR and let st be the side
which is closest to circle C. If st does not contain any of the kNNs of C,











Figure 3.9: Check if E may contain qualifying objects
The proof is straight-forward, since any point in the MBR will be further
away from C than the closest point on st. In our example, the right side
st of E is closer to C. Assume there is a point d on st, such that the
perpendicular bisector ⊥dp1 is tangent to C, and let e ≡ ⊥dp1∩C. Then we




|p1e|2 − |p1f |2 = |cf |2 − r2
(3.2)
The first equation is derived from the fact that e ∈ C, while the second
one is because the distance from any point on ⊥dp1 to d and p1 is equal.
The third equation results from the application of the Pythagorean theorem
on the orthogonal triangles p1fe and fec which have a common side ef .
After substituting the points with their Cartesian coordinates, we get the
following system (note that xf =
xd+xp1
2 , yf =
yd+yp1
2 , since f is the middle
of dp1):
3If a different side of E is closer to C, the equations are modified accordingly.
37

(xe − xc)2 + (ye − yc)2 = r2
(xd − xe)2 + (yd − ye)2 = (xp1 − xe)2 + (yp1 − ye)2













There are three equations and three unknowns: xe, ye, yd. If there is a real
solution to this system, under the condition (xd, yd) ∈ st, then there may be
a qualifying object inside the subtree of E. Else all objects in E are further
away from C than the current objects in SL, so the subtree under E can be
pruned.
Solving this system, however, is slow (in the order of 100’s of msec in
an average computer); given that an entry E must be checked against many
objects, the running time is prohibitively long. Therefore, in our implemen-
tation, we use the RkNN algorithm to traverse the R-tree and employ the
CkNN algorithm only for the objects at the leaf-level. Our strategy is based
on the following observation:
Lemma 3.6. Let C be a circle, MER the maximum enclosed axis-parallel
rectangle of C and S the set of kNNs of MER’s perimeter. Let pi be an
object, such that pi is inside MER and pi 6∈ S. Then pi cannot be a kNN








Figure 3.10: The MBR and the MER of C
Proof. Assume the lemma does not hold. Figure 3.10 shows an example
where p2 is inside MER and p2 6∈ S. Assume that p2 is the NN of point e ∈
C. Let d be the point where the line segment p2e intersects the perimeter
of MER, and p1 be the object which is the NN of d. It follows from our
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hypothesis that: |p2e| < |p1e|. Using the triangular inequality, we get:
|p2d|+ |de| < |p1d|+ |de| ⇒ |p2d| < |p1d| which is a contradiction, since p1
is the NN of d. Therefore, the lemma holds.
We construct the Minimum Bounding Rectangle4 MBR and the Max-
imum Enclosed Rectangle MER of C (the side-length of MER is √2r).
Conceptually, our implementation works in three steps:
1. Use theRkNN algorithm to find the set S1 of kNNs ofMBR (including
all the objects inside MBR). Recall that S1 is a superset of the kNNs
of any point inside MBR; therefore, it contains all the kNNs of C.
2. Use CNN (see Section 2.4) to find the set S2 of kNNs of only the
perimeter of MER. Use Lemma 3.6 and S2 to prune objects from S1.
3. Call the CkNN algorithm with the objects remaining in S1.
In practice, these steps can be combined. In a single traversal of the R-tree,
steps (1) and (2) can be used at the intermediate levels to prune the tree
and step (3) is applied on the leaf-level objects.
4For a set of users U1...n, the MBR of C is not the same as their corresponding anonymiz-
ing rectangle R.
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Figure 3.11: North-America (NA) dataset
3.6 Experimental Evaluation
This section evaluates our proposed anonymization and query processing
algorithms. We implemented prototypes for both the anonymizer and the
LBS using C++. All experiments were executed on an Intel Xeon 2.8GHz
machine with 2.5GB of RAM and Linux OS. Our workload for user positions
and landmarks/points of interest consists of the NA dataset [61], which con-
tains 569K locations on the North-American continent (Figure 3.11). Per-
formance is measured in terms of CPU time, I/O time and communication
cost. At the anonymizer we employed main-memory structures, therefore
we measured only the CPU time. At the LBS, we used an R*-Tree and
measured the total time (i.e., I/O and CPU time); in all experiments we
maintained a cache with size equal to 10% of the corresponding R*-Tree.
The communication cost was measured in terms of number of candidates
sent from the LBS back to the anonymizer.
In the following, Section 3.6.1 focuses on cloaking algorithms at the
anonymizer, whereas Section 3.6.2 evaluates query processing at the LBS.
3.6.1 Anonymizer Evaluation
We compare the proposed Nearest Neighbor Cloak (NNC ) and Hilbert Cloak
(HC ) against Casper and Interval Cloak (IC ). The first experiment mea-












































(b) Varying N , K=80
Figure 3.12: Area of rectangular K -ASR
ASR area, since it affects the processing time at the LBS and the communi-
cation cost between the LBS and the anonymizer. First, we fix the number
of users N = 50, 000 and vary the degree of anonymity K . The K -ASR area
is expressed as a percentage of the entire data space. We generated 1, 000
queries originating at random users. Figure 3.12a shows the average area
per query. Clearly IC is the worst algorithm, whereas NNC is the best.
HC and Casper exhibit similar behavior to each other. All algorithms scale
linearly with K in terms of ASR area. Figure 3.12b, shows the K -ASR area
for K = 80 and varying N . Since the extent of the data space remains con-




































































(b) Varying N , K=80
Figure 3.13: K -ASR generation time
reduced K -ASR size for all methods. The relative performance among the
algorithms remains the same. Observe that HC and Casper outperform IC,
and generate ASRs with roughly twice the area of NNC.
Figure 3.13 shows the average ASR generation time (in milliseconds)
for varying K and N . HC, IC and Casper behave similarly. NNC , on
the other hand, has a significantly larger generation time, due to the more
costly nearest-neighbor search. Nevertheless, we will show in the following
that NNC is best in terms of overhead at the LBS.
So far, we focused on rectangular K -ASRs. However, depending on the









































(b) Varying N , K=80
Figure 3.14: Rectangular vs SA K -ASR, Nearest Neighbor Cloak
a simple optimization: first we identify the set of users which belong to
a K -ASR. Then we calculate the minimum bounding rectangle R and the
minimum enclosing circle C of the K -ASR, and select the shape with the
smallest area. We call this method SA. NNC is more suitable to be com-
bined with SA, since the nearest neighbor search tends to identify circular
clusters of users. Figures 3.14a and 3.14b compare the rectangle-only ap-
proach against the SA optimization for varying K and N , respectively. SA
manages to reduce the K -ASR area by up to 15%.
















Figure 3.15: center-of-ASR attack, K= 50
gorithms against the center-of-ASR attack5. We consider a workload of
1000 queries, originating at a set of random users, with K = 50. Figure 3.15
shows the probability P [indexU = i] (the experiment is similar to that of
Section 2.2). Recall that indexU = 1 means that user U is the closest to
the center of the K -ASR. Furthermore, the dashed line corresponds to the
distribution of indexU for the ideal anonymization technique. All studied
algorithms preserve privacy in the case of the center-of-ASR attack. NNC
is close to the ideal distribution and there are few cases where the K -ASR
encloses more than K users, which explains the relatively small ASR size
observed in the previous experiments. HC and Casper exhibit similar be-
havior to each other, but include a larger number of redundant users inside
the K -ASR, compared to NNC ; this is why P [indexU = i] > 0 for i > K.
However, they are both better than IC.
3.6.2 Location-Based Service Evaluation
For this experiment, we generate 1, 000 queries originating at random users.
The corresponding K -ASRs are sent to the LBS and the queries are exe-
cuted against the entire NA dataset, which is indexed by an R*-tree. For
all K -ASR generation techniques, we compare the average processing time
(i.e, CPU plus I/O time) per query, and the size of the candidate set. The
5Although we formally proved that Hilbert Cloak guarantees location anonymity, we






















































(b) Avg. processing time (sec)
Figure 3.16: kNN queries, varying k, N = 50, 000, K = 80
latter is a superset of the actual result, and it reflects the communication
cost between the LBS and the anonymizer. First, we focus on kNN queries.
Figure 3.16 shows the performance for varying number of nearest neighbors
k. NNC generates a significantly lower number of candidates compared to
the other techniques. This is expected, since the sizes of the correspond-
ing K -ASRs are also smaller. HC and Casper generate up to 50% more
candidates than NNC. However, they both outperform IC by a large mar-
gin. In terms of processing time, NNC is the fastest, with HC and Casper



















































(b) Avg. processing time (sec)
Figure 3.17: kNN queries, varying K , k = 2 neighbors, N = 50, 000
In Figure 3.17 we fix the number of neighbors k = 2 and vary the degree
of anonymity K . Again, NNC performs best, followed by HC and Casper.
The difference is more significant for larger K values, as the average size of





















































(b) Avg. processing time (sec)
Figure 3.18: kNN queries, varying N , k = 2, K = 80
Figure 3.18 shows the number of candidates and processing time for
varying N . Note that more users lead to higher density, thus smaller K -
ASRs. Consequently, the number of candidates and the average processing




















































(b) Avg. processing time (sec)
Figure 3.19: Range queries, N = 50, 000, varying K
We also evaluated the performance of the four techniques for range
queries. The results are presented in Figure 3.19 for varying K and N =
50, 000. Again, we observe a significant advantage of NNC over the other
techniques, while HC and Casper outperform IC in terms of both processing
cost and candidate set size. The trends for varying N are similar.
















































(b) Avg. processing time (sec)
Figure 3.20: NNC , rectangular vs SA K -ASR, k = 2, N = 50, 000
investigated the effect of the SA (i.e., smallest area) optimization on query
processing. For a given K -ASR, if SA generates a circular range C, we em-
ploy CkNN to execute the corresponding kNN query. For our workload,
SA generated circular ranges for around 45% of the K -ASRs when K was
small, and up to 90% for large values of K. Figure 3.20 compares SA against

















































(b) Avg. processing time (sec)
Figure 3.21: NNC , rectangular vs SA K -ASR, k = 2, K = 80
duces the number of candidates by up to 18%, compared to the rectangular
K -ASR. The tradeoff is the increased processing time. The same relative
performance is observed in Figure 3.21, where we vary N .
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3.7 Discussion
Our proposed anonymization algorithms are clearly superior compared to
the existing approaches. The HC algorithm provides privacy guarantees
under all user and query distributions, and its overhead in terms of ASR
generation time, query processing time and communication cost is similar
to Casper , the most recent and most efficient technique. On the other hand,
NNC clearly outperforms Casper in terms of overhead at the LBS, while
offering similar anonymity strength.
The LBS is likely to maintain huge volumes of data and disk-based data
structures, while the anonymizer typically uses memory-based data struc-
tures. For this reason, the query overhead at the LBS is considerably larger
than at the anonymizer (observe that time is measured in milliseconds in
Figure 3.13 instead of seconds in Figure 3.16b). Under these circumstances,
the reduced LBS processing cost offers NNC an important performance ad-
vantage, despite its increased K -ASR generation time.
The choice between Hilbert Cloak and Nearest Neighbor Cloak involves a
clear trade-off between privacy guarantees on one hand, and processing over-
head on the other. If provable anonymity guarantees are required, Hilbert
Cloak is the only option. Nevertheless, Nearest Neighbor Cloak also achieves
strong anonymity for most of the cases, and may be acceptable for appli-
cations where outliers do not constitute an anonymity threat (e.g., very
frequent user movement) and efficiency is crucial.
Finally, there is a tradeoff between rectangular-only K -ASRs and the SA
optimization. The cost of CkNN at the LBS is higher than RkNN. However,
CkNN reduces the number of candidates. Therefore, CkNN is preferable if
the communication cost is more important than the processing cost at the
LBS. In practice, this happens if a single anonymizer sends queries to several
LBSs. In this case the bandwidth of the single anonymizer is shared among
all connections. Thus, it is important to minimize the communication cost,






In the previous chapter, we have introduced the reciprocity concept, a suf-
ficient condition to guarantee privacy for snapshot LBS queries. In this
chapter, we propose a general framework to implement reciprocity in con-
junction with a spatial index. We investigate several methods to group the
set of users into reciprocal partitions, which provide a trade-off between the
size of the resulting K -ASR, and the time required to generate it.
We also extend the reciprocity principle to address the scenario where
an attacker has additional background knowledge on the frequencies of gen-
erating queries for each LBS user.
4.2 Algorithm for Reciprocal Cloaking
We consider the architecture of Figure 1.3, where an anonymizer receives
queries from geographically distributed users, removes the user IDs, hides
their locations, and forwards the resulting ASRs to the LBS. Each query
has a required degree of anonymity K, which ranges between 1 (no privacy
requirements) and the user cardinality (maximum privacy).
The anonymizer indexes the user locations by a hierarchical (i.e., tree-
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based) spatial index (e.g., R*-tree, Quad-tree, etc). Let U be the user issuing
a query. We propose a general spatial cloaking algorithm, called Reciprocal,
which traverses the tree and generates a reciprocal AS that contains U and
at least K -1 users in its vicinity. The resulting K -ASR is the area that
encloses all elements of the AS. Figure 4.1 illustrates the pseudo-code for
the reciprocal framework. LetN be the leaf node that contains U . Reciprocal
traverses the tree in a bottom-up fashion, starting from N . The important
observation here is that even if N contains enough (≥ K ) points (we use
the term user and point interchangeably) for the anonymity requirements,
we still have to traverse the tree bottom-up (lines 1-2), if there is a node N ′
at the same level as N such that 0 < |N ′| < K, because N ′ may contain a
user U ′ whose AS includes U .
Reciprocal (query issuer U , anonymity degree K, node N)
//initially N is the leaf node containing U
1. while (∃ non-empty node at the same level as N with < K users)
2. N = N.parent //bottom-up traversal
3. while (N not leaf) and
(∀ child of N is either empty or contains ≥ K users)
4. N = child of N that contains U //top-down traversal
5. ASR = Partition(U,K,N)
Figure 4.1: Reciprocal Cloaking
Let AN be the ancestor of N when the bottom-up traversal stops. Each
node at the level of AN is either empty (non-balanced trees such as the
Quad-tree can have empty nodes at any level), or contains at leastK users in
its sub-tree. This implies that the AS can be determined locally within AN
because all other queries (originating outside AN) do not need to include
users of AN in their AS. Having established that AN can autonomously
generate a K -ASR, Reciprocal traverses AN top-down towards U (lines 3-4)
as long as each sub-tree has at least K points1. Let PN be the node in
AN where the top-down traversal stops. PN includes U in its sub-tree and
1While bottom-up traversal considers the cardinality of all nodes at a level, top-down
only takes into account the cardinalities at a single path
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some of its child nodes have fewer than K points. PN is called the partition
node, and corresponds to the lowest ancestor of U where we can achieve
reciprocity. This is because all nodes in the sub-tree of AN and at the level
of PN or above, contain at least K points, and thus can generate ASRs
without using any points in PN .
PN may contain numerous (À K ) points, which is likely to yield very
large ASRs. The Partition routine (line 5) eliminates this problem by group-
ing these points into disjoint buckets. The users in the same bucket bU as
U form the AS for the query. As we will discuss in Section 4.3, several
partitioning methods can be used, provided that:
i. each bucket contains at least K and no more than 2K − 1 points.
The lower bound is due to the K -anonymity requirement. The upper
bound is due to the fact that if the cardinality of a bucket exceeds
2K − 1, the bucket can be split into smaller ones, each containing at
least K users.
ii. partitioning is independent of the query point, i.e., each user in the
node will generate exactly the same partitioning for the same K. This
property guarantees reciprocity.
After determining the AS, we form the ASR as the minimum bound-
ing rectangle (MBR) covering AS. Note that, the MBR may enclose some
additional users that are not in AS. Compared to the fixed cells of Casper
and Interval Cloak, MBRs adapt more effectively to the density around the
query, i.e., if the query lies in an area with numerous users, the ASR is likely
to be small. The disadvantage is that the MBR reveals the coordinates of
points on its boundaries. Furthermore, in case that there are K (or more)
users at the same location, the ASR may degenerate to a single point and
disclose the positions of these users. A simple way to overcome these prob-
lems is to superimpose a grid where the cell size corresponds to a pre-defined
anonymity resolution [49]. Then, the ASR sent to the LBS is the minimum
enlargement that aligns the MBR to the grid. For the following discussion
we omit this modification because the cell size depends on the application









































(b) Partitioning at leaf level
Figure 4.2: Partitioning with a Quad-tree
should be secure even if the attacker has complete knowledge of all the user
positions.
Reciprocal can be applied in conjunction with main-memory or disk-
based, and space-partitioning or data-partitioning indices. The following
example demonstrates Reciprocal on top of a Quad-tree. We will present
R*-tree examples in Section 4.3.
Example 4.1 (Quad-tree Cloak). Figure 4.2a illustrates an example where
6 clients are indexed by a Quad-tree (level 1 corresponds to the leaf cells).
Assume a query withK = 2 originating from U1. Since the cell 〈(0, 2), (1, 3)〉
of U1 already contains 2 clients, Casper (and Interval Cloak) would use it
directly as the ASR. This violates reciprocity because there are four level-
1 cells that contain a single point; e.g., a query with K = 2 from any of
these cells could include U1 in its AS. In contrast, Quad-tree Cloak (QC)
ascends to level 2, where there still exist non-empty cells (e.g. 〈(0, 0), (2, 2)〉)
with fewer than K users. Finally, QC reaches the root and sets AN =
PN = 〈(0, 0), (4, 4)〉. The same partition node is obtained for all users given
K = 2.
In the above query, PN contains 6 points, although only 2 are required
for the anonymity requirements. Partition groups these 6 points into buck-
ets of 2 or 3 (i.e. K to 2K − 1), and includes in AS the users from the same
bucket bU as U1. Assuming that AS = {U1, U2, U6}, the ASR is the shaded
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MBR of Figure 4.2a. Figure 4.2b illustrates a second example, which in addi-
tion involves the top-down traversal phase. Given again a query with K = 2
from U1, the bottom-up traversal stops at level 2 with AN = 〈(0, 2), (2, 4)〉
because all non-empty cells at this level have at least 2 points. Further-
more, both non-empty children of AN , 〈(0, 2), (1, 3)〉 and 〈(1, 3), (2, 4)〉, also
include 2 points each. Therefore, QC descends to level 1 and sets the par-
tition node to PN = 〈(0, 2), (1, 3)〉. Since this cell contains only U1 and
U2, Partition returns directly the MBR of these users, without performing
grouping. In general, if |PN | < 2K, then there is a single bucket containing
all the points in PN .
Theorem 4.2. Reciprocal guarantees spatial K-anonymity.
Proof. We show that each AS generated by Reciprocal satisfies reciprocity,
by retracing the steps of the algorithm. The bottom-up traversal terminates
at an ancestor node AN such that each node at the level of AN is either
empty or contains at least K users. Therefore, no user in AN belongs to the
AS of any other user outside AN , and vice versa. The top-down traversal
determines a partition node PN , that satisfies similar conditions, i.e., each
sibling of PN (under the same parent) is either empty or has at least K
points in its sub-tree. Thus, an AS can be assembled locally in PN without
violating reciprocity. Finally, Partition generates buckets that by definition
obey reciprocity, since each bucket contains at least K users, and each query
with the same K from a user in PN will lead to exactly the same bucket.
A simple method for guaranteeing reciprocity could load all the points
and apply Partition(U,K, root), i.e., directly set AN = PN = root, without
performing bottom-up and top-down traversals. In fact, this is similar to
the relational K -anonymity (RKA) generalization techniques surveyed in
Section 2.1, except that SKA requires a single group (instead of the entire
anonymized table). Clearly, this approach would be inefficient because it
has to access all the user locations. Furthermore, it would probably be
ineffective (i.e., would lead to large ASRs), since it does not take advantage
of the existing grouping of users in the index nodes.
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Reciprocal needs the cardinality of the node with the minimum number of
points per level. These numbers (i.e., one per level) can be explicitly stored
and updated when there is change in the tree structure. Alternatively, if
the index has a minimum node utilization M (e.g., R-trees), we can set the
minimum cardinality at level i to its lower bound M i (leaves are at level
1). This does not affect correctness, but may have a negative impact on
performance, if the actual minimum cardinality is significantly higher than
the lower bound. Furthermore, the top-down traversal requires the number
of points in each entry of an intermediate node (line 3). We assume that
this number is stored with the corresponding entry. Such structures are
called aggregate indexes, and have been used extensively in spatio-temporal
data warehouses [59]. Finally, note that, the location updates issued by the
users can be handled automatically by the corresponding algorithms of the
indices, without any effect on the anonymization process.
4.3 Partitioning Methods
Given a partition node PN , Partition (line 5 in Figure 4.1) splits the users
inside the sub-tree of PN into buckets containing between K and 2K − 1
users. In the sequel we discuss alternative partitioning algorithms. Sec-
tions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 present two novel methods with different tradeoffs in
efficiency and effectiveness. Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 adapt two RKA tech-
niques to our framework. Although all techniques can be used with any
spatial index, the examples assume an aggregate R*-tree (aR*-tree [59]),
i.e., an R*-tree where each intermediate node entry stores the total num-
ber of points in the corresponding sub-tree. The resulting implementation is
called R-Tree Cloak (RC). For ease of presentation, we assume that the min-
imum node cardinality per level i is M i, where M is the R*-tree minimum
node utilization (usually 40% of the node capacity).
4.3.1 Greedy Hilbert Partitioning (GH)
Let LN be the leaf node containing the query issuer. We first consider that
partitioning takes place at the leaf level, i.e.,K ≤M and PN = LN . Similar
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Figure 4.3: GH partitioning for (leaf) level 1
according to their Hilbert value. The Hilbert space filling curve transforms
the multi-dimensional coordinates of each user U into an 1-D value H(U).
Figure 4.3 illustrates the Hilbert curve for a 2-D space using a 8x8 space
partitioning. A point U is assigned the value H(U) of the cell that covers
it. If two users are near each other in the 2-D space, they are likely to be
close in the 1-D transformation. Given a query with required anonymization
degree K, GH assigns the first K points (in the Hilbert order) to the first
bucket, the next K points to the second bucket and so on. Following this
approach, each bucket contains exactly K users, except for the last one that
may include up to 2K − 1 users. Let rU be the rank of U in the Hilbert
order (1 ≤ rU ≤ |LN |). The bucket bU of U contains all clients whose ranks
are in the range [s, e], where s = rU − (rU − 1) mod K and e = s+K − 1
(unless bU is the last bucket).
Example 4.3. Figure 4.3 elaborates the application of GH to a leaf node
containing 10 users, whose IDs are ordered according to their Hilbert value.
Consider a query from U7 with K = 5. The rank of U7 is r(U7) = 7. The
bucket containing U7 starts at s = 7−6 mod 5 = 6 and ends at e = 10, i.e.,
it contains all users U6 to U10. Its ASR is the MBR (shaded rectangle at
the upper-right corner) covering the corresponding points. Any query with
K = 5 originating from these users will generate the same bU , AS and ASR,
thus, guaranteeing reciprocity. Note that, GH constructs on-the-fly only bU ,
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Figure 4.4: GH partitioning for level 2
another ASR (shaded rectangle at the lower-left corner) for a query with
K = 3 originating from one of U1 to U3.
In case that partitioning takes place above the leaf level, GH could simply
load the entire sub-tree of the partition node PN and compute bU (and its
ASR) as above, which would be similar to using Hilbert Cloak. However,
this process is not necessary since we only need bU (and not the other buckets
at this level). Figure 4.4 shows an example, assuming that the query issuer
U is in leaf node LN4. The leaves are numbered according to their Hilbert
order in the parent PN ; specifically, each node is assigned the Hilbert value
of the cell that covers its center in the data space defined by the MBR of
PN . The cardinality of each leaf node is shown in the corresponding entry
of PN .
If K = 30, the bucket bU includes 5 users from LN3, 10 users from LN4
and 15 users from LN5. The nodes that must be accessed for generating bU
are LN4, PN , and LN3. Inside LN3, only the 5 last users in the Hilbert
order (in the data space defined by the MBR of LN3) contribute to bU , while
the rest are assigned to the first bucket (not computed). Note that, since
the entire LN5 is included in bU , the node is not visited, but its MBR is
simply merged to that of the bucket. In some cases the leaf node containing
U may fall on the boundary between two buckets. In Figure 4.4, if K = 20,
the first 5 users of LN4 are assigned to the second bucket, and the remaining
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to the third one. Depending on the position of U in the Hilbert order, either
of these two buckets constitutes bU .
Figure 4.5 illustrates the general GH method. First, GH computes the
extent of the bucket bU that contains U . Recall that this requires the rank
of U in the Hilbert order of N . The function compute rank performs this
computation in a recursive manner. Specifically, rU is the rank of U in LN
plus the sum of cardinalities of all nodes that precede the ancestors of U in
the path from LN to PN . For instance, if K = 30 in Figure 4.4, then rU
is the rank of U among the points of LN4 plus the cardinalities of LN1 to
LN3. Once bU has been determined, all leaf nodes that contribute points
to bU participate in the ASR construction through the merge function. The
merging process is also recursive. Specifically, if an entry E is totally in-
cluded within the bucket, it causes the replacement of the ASR with a larger
one, whose maximum (minimum) coordinate on each axis is the maximum
(minimum) between the corresponding coordinates of E and the original
ASR. If E is only partially included, we have to read its contents and repeat
this process; there can be at most two such entries per level.
GH involves accessing only (i) the nodes from the path LN to PN (i.e.,
one node per level) and (ii) leaf nodes that are partially (but not totally)
included in bU (i.e., at most two nodes). The first set of nodes is used for
the computation of rU . Other intermediate nodes are not necessary since
their contribution to rU is determined by their cardinalities, which are stored
with their parent entries (lines 13-14). Furthermore, leaf nodes that do not
intersect bU are ignored, whereas the MBRs of those totally included in bU
are directly aggregated in the ASR.
For index structures that impose a minimum occupancy constraint M ,
such as the R-tree, the PN node is situated at height at most dlogM Ke. At
each level below the PN node, at most two nodes are accessed, hence the I/O
cost is O(logM K). The computation complexity of GH includes: (i) sorting
of entries according to Hilbert values (line 8 in Figure 4.5) in each accessed
node, which takes O(M · log2M · logM K), (ii) computation of bucket extent
(lines 3-5) which has O(1) cost, and (iii) determining the ASR extent (17-23)
with O(M · logM K) cost. Therefore, the overall computational complexity
is O(M · log2M · logM K).
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GH-partitioning(query issuer U , anonymity degree K, partition node PN)
1. ASR = ∅
2. rU = compute rank(PN, 0)
3. s = rU − (rU − 1) mod K ; e = s+K − 1 // extent of bU
4. if |PN | − e < K // bU is the last bucket
5. e = |PN |; s = e− (e mod K)−K + 1
6. for each entry E of PN intersecting bU = [s, e] //E is point or node
7. ASR = merge(E,ASR)
compute rank(N , rU )
8. list = entries of N sorted in Hilbert order
9. if N is leaf node
10. rU = rU+ position of U in list
11. else // N is an internal node
12. let E be the entry that contains U
13. for each entry E′ before E in list
14. rU = rU + |E′|
15. rU = compute rank(E, rU )
16. return rU
merge(E, ASR)
17. if E is totally included in bU = [s, e]
18. for each dimension d
19. ASRd−min = min(ASRd−min, Ed−min)
20. ASRd−max = max(ASRd−max, Ed−max)
21. else // E intersects but is not included in bU
22. for each entry E′ of E that intersects bU = [s, e]
23. ASR = merge(E′, ASR)
Figure 4.5: Greedy Hilbert - general method
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4.3.2 Asymmetric R-tree Split (AR)
The AR partitioning method is inspired by the R*-tree construction algo-
rithm2, which is known to have good locality properties. A straightforward
approach is to apply the R*-split [13] on the partition node, after setting the
minimum node utilization to K. Specifically, R*-split first sorts all points by
their x-coordinates. Then, it considers every division of the sorted list in two
nodes N , N ′ so that each node contains at least K points, and computes
the perimeters of N and N ′. The overall perimeter on the x-axis equals
the sum of all the perimeters. The process is repeated for the y-axis, and
the axis with the minimal overall perimeter becomes the split dimension.
Subsequently, R*-split examines again all possible divisions on the selected
dimension, and selects the one that yields the minimum overlap between
the MBRs of the resulting nodes. The split is recursively applied on each
partition with more than 2K − 1 users.
R*-split has some shortcomings with respect to the problem at hand.
First it attempts to minimize factors such as perimeter and overlap of the
resulting nodes, whereas we aim at minimizing the ASR area. Even if we
modify the algorithm to consider only the ASR area, R*-split can still lead
to fragmentation, i.e., a split may create partitions with a large number of
redundant users, such that no subsequent splits are possible. As an example,
consider that we want to partition the 6 points of Figure 4.6a into buckets, so
that each bucket contains at least K=2 users. The split point that minimizes
the sum of resulting areas is x=C, which eliminates the largest gap (i.e., dead
area) between partitions P1 and P2. No further split can be performed, since
each new node contains 3 users.
To address the problem of fragmentation, AR takes into account both
the area and the cardinality of the resulting partitions. Specifically, AR
generates partitions P1 and P2 that minimize the objective function:
[ASR(P1) +ASR(P2)] · |P1| · |P2| (4.1)
subject to the constraint that |P1| and |P2| are at least K. AR favors un-
balanced splits, which are desirable, since they achieve low fragmentation.
2Although AR is inspired by R*-tree, the method can be used on top of any spatial






























Figure 4.6: R*-tree split vs AR
Continuing the example in Figure 4.6b, any of the split points C1 or C2 would
yield split cost (200+620) ·2 ·4 = 6560, compared to 2 ·400 ·3 ·3 = 7200 gen-
erated by C. Hence, AR would split on either C1 or C2, and subsequently
allow a second split, resulting in three ASRs, with a total weighted ASR
area of 2 · (200 + 110 + 200) = 1020, compared to 2400 for R*-split.
Figure 4.7 shows the pseudocode for AR. Lines 6-15 of compute ASR(U,N)
identify the best split point (according to the objective function) for split-
ting node N by looping over all dimensions and split points in the range
K to |N | − K. Let listsplit dim be the list of points sorted on the split
dimension. The position of U in listsplit dim determines the partition N ′
that contains it. If U is before split point, then N ′ includes all points of
listsplit dim in the range [1, split point]. Otherwise, N ′ includes all points in
the range [split point+1, |listsplit dim|]. In either case, N ′ is split recursively.
Note that the other partition of N is not split as it is not necessary for the
computation of bU .
Similarly to GH, if an index with minimum node occupancy is used, the
PN node is situated at height at most dlogM Ke. However, this time all
nodes under PN need to be accessed, with an I/O cost of O(1+M +M2+
. . . +Mα) where α = dlogMKe, which equals to O(K). The computation
complexity of AR is a function of K and |PN |: at each split of a partition
P with more than 2K − 1 points, a sorting phase is employed, with cost
|P | · log|P |. In the worst case, each split is unbalanced, and yields two
partitions with cardinalities |P |−K and K; the former is split further, until
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AR (query issuing user U , anonymity requirement K, partition node PN)
1. load all points in PN
2. compute ASR(U,PN)
compute-ASR(U , N)
3. if |N | < 2K
4. return MBR(N)
5. min split cost = inf
6. for d = 1 to #dimensions // for each dimension
7. listd = sort points according to d coordinate
8. for point = K to |N | −K
9. P1 = listd[1..point]
10. P2 = listd[point+ 1..|listd|]
11. split cost = [ASR(P1) +ASR(P2)] · |P1| · |P2|
12. If split cost < min split cost
13. min split cost = split cost
14. split point = point
15. split dim = d
16. if rank(U) in listsplit dim ≤ split point
17. N ′ = points in listsplit dim[1 . . . split point]
18. else // U is in the second node of the split
19. N ′ = points in listsplit dim[split point+ 1 . . . |listsplit dim|]
20. return compute ASR(U,N ′)
Figure 4.7: Asymmetric R-tree Split (AR)
it has less than 2K points. The complexity is:
|PN |/K∑
i=2









4.3.3 Dynamic Programming Hilbert (DH)
DH is an adaptation of the RKA method proposed in [30]. We use DH as

























Figure 4.8: GH and DH partitions for K=4
demonstrates the versatility of our framework. DH is motivated by the fact
that greedy selection may generate sub-optimal buckets. Figure 4.8a shows
the GH partitioning for K = 4 and the leaf node contents of Figure 4.3.
Observe that the MBR of the second bucket (containing U5 to U10) is rather
large. The problem is caused by U5, which would be better grouped with
the points of the first bucket. DH applies dynamic programming to find
the best clustering, given the Hilbert order. For instance, in Figure 4.8b
DH would include U5 in the first bucket since the small increase of its MBR
is compensated by the large decrease in the ASR of the second bucket.
The sum over all ASR areas multiplied by their cardinality is an estimation
of effectiveness (i.e., ASR processing cost at the LBS). Hence, we aim at




area(A) · |A| (4.3)
DH first loads all the data points of the partition node PN and sorts
them. Let e be a position in the Hilbert order. WASRmin(e) is the optimal
weighted sum of ASR areas (of all buckets), when the first e points have
been partitioned. ASR(s, e) is the area of the MBR containing all points
between positions s and e (s < e). The intuition behind DH is that the total
weighted area of the best partitioning equals the minimum sum of (i) the
total weighted area of the best partitioning for the first s users plus (ii) the
ASR of the last bucket, containing the remaining |PN |−s points, multiplied
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by its cardinality. Formally:
WASRmin(|PN |) = min|PN |−2K<s≤|PN |−K
 WASRmin(s)+(|PN | − s) ·ASR(s+ 1, |PN |)

(4.4)
The range |PN | − 2K < s ≤ |PN | − K is due to the fact that each
bucket must include between K and 2K − 1 users. The expression above
can be calculated by Dynamic Programming. Because each bucket can have
up to 2K − 1 users, the computation complexity of Dynamic Programming
becomes O(K · |PN |). DH needs to load all points inside PN . Therefore,
the I/O cost is O(K) (i.e., the same as AR).
4.3.4 Top-Down Clustering (TD)
For completeness, our evaluation includes one more recent method from the
RKA literature as a benchmark. Specifically, we adapt Top Down (TD),
a divisive clustering-based approach that builds anonymized groups with
cardinality bounded between K and 2K − 1 [66]. The adaptation works
as follows. Once the partition node PN has been determined, all points of
PN are loaded and form one large cluster. TD chooses as seeds two of the
most distant points (through an approximate, iterative, linear technique)
and divides the cluster among the seeds, so that the extents of the resulting
clusters are minimized. The process is repeated recursively for all resulting
clusters with cardinality 2K or higher. After completion of this step, some
clusters (called runts) may have fewer than K items. To preserve the K -
anonymity requirement, a runt may either be merged with another runt, or
borrow points from one of the clusters with more than K items. The algo-
rithm terminates when all clusters have at least K items. TD has O(|PN |2)
computation complexity and O(K) I/O cost.
4.3.5 Discussion
The proposed partitioning techniques provide different tradeoffs of efficiency
and effectiveness. At one end, GH (which is very localized) is fast in terms
of both I/O and CPU cost, but may yield large ASRs. At the other end,
AR, DH and TD are more expensive, since they have to read the entire
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sub-tree of PN and perform CPU-intensive computations, but they usually
yield smaller ASRs. The choice of partitioning technique depends on the
application characteristics. If, for instance, the anonymizer charges clients
according to their usage, and the LBS is a public service, it may be preferable
to use GH. On the other hand, if the LBS imposes limitations (e.g., on the
number of results, processing time, etc) AR (or DH, TD) is a better choice.
In Section 4.5 we experimentally evaluate these tradeoffs.
4.4 SKA With Variable Query Frequencies
So far, we assumed that every user may issue a query with equal probability.
However, in practice, the query frequency distribution among users can be
skewed. For instance, a taxi driver may issue numerous queries due to the
nature of his occupation. In this section, we extend the reciprocal framework
to variable query frequencies. Assuming the worst case scenario, we consider
that the attacker knows the query frequencies of all users (e.g., by obtaining
billing records).
The definition of SKA is the same as for uniform query frequencies,
but the reciprocity property as discussed so far is not sufficient to guarantee
SKA. Assume AS={U1, U2, . . . , UK}, with user query frequencies F1, F2, . . . ,
FK , and that U1 has twice the query frequency of the other users in AS.
Even if AS satisfies reciprocity, based on the knowledge of frequencies, an
attacker can pinpoint U1 as the query source with probability F1/(F1 +
F2 + . . . + FK) = 2/(K + 1) > 1/K for all values of K > 1. If a query
has anonymity degree K, in order to preserve SKA it is necessary that,
Fi/(F1+F2+. . .+FK) ≤ 1/K, ∀Ui ∈ AS. Below, we generalize the reciprocity
requirement to incorporate information about query frequencies:
Definition 4.4 (Frequency-Aware Reciprocity (FQR)). Consider a user U
with query frequency F issuing a query with anonymity degree K, anonymiz-
ing set AS = {U1, U2, . . . , U|AS|}, and anonymizing spatial region ASR. AS
satisfies the frequency-aware reciprocity (FQR) property if (i) it contains U ,
(ii) every Ui ∈AS generates the same anonymizing set AS for the same value
of K and (iii) ∀Ui ∈ AS, it holds that Fi/(F1 + F2 + . . .+ F|AS|) ≤ 1/K.
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An immediate consequence of condition (iii) is that K · Fmax ≤ (F1 +
F2 + . . . + FN ), where Fmax is the maximum query frequency of any user
in AS. Note that, the reciprocity property discussed in the previous sec-
tions is a special case of FQR where all users have equal query frequency.
The reciprocal framework can be extended to achieve FQR by incorporat-
ing frequency-related information. Assume frequency is represented as the
number of queries issued by each user in a previous time interval. For each
sub-tree, i.e. internal index node N , we store the sum of frequencies F
of users rooted at N , together with the maximum frequency Fmax in the
sub-tree. N can accommodate by itself any query with K < F/Fmax. The
Reciprocal algorithm of Figure 4.1 remains the same, except from line 3,
which changes to:
3. while (N not leaf) and (∀ child of N is empty or has K < F/Fmax)
Figure 4.9: Reciprocal Cloaking Change for Variable Frequency
Next, we discuss how GH can be extended to accommodate FQR. Re-
call that, after the partition node PN has been determined, GH sorts the
points according to Hilbert values, and creates buckets that contain at least
K consecutive points. In the case of Frequency-Aware GH (FQGH), each
point (i.e., user) is conceptually replicated a number of times equal to its
query frequency. Hence, each point appears multiple times in the Hilbert
sequence, although it is physically stored only once in the index, along with
its frequency. The resulting sequence is split into buckets of K · Fmax each,
where Fmax is the maximum frequency that occurs in PN .
Example 4.5. Figure 4.10 illustrates the application of FQGH: each node
stores the additional frequency information. At the level 2 PN node, the
total number of queries in the sub-tree is F = 28, whereas Fmax = 7. Assume
a query with K = 2: the splitting into buckets is performed with respect to
K · Fmax = 2 · 7 = 14, and buckets B1 and B2 are obtained.
Since the split is performed with respect to frequencies, it is possible for
a user to belong to more than one bucket. However, since the bucket size
is at least K · Fmax, it is straightforward to show that a user can belong
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Figure 4.10: FQGH partitioning, K=2
fraction p of its queries to B1, and (1−p) to B2. Then, B1 will be chosen as
ASR with probability p, and B2 with (1−p). In Figure 4.10, U7 contributes
with 3/7 of its points to B1, and 4/7 to B2; hence, if U7 issues a query with
K = 2, the respective generation probabilities for the two buckets are 0.43
and 0.57.
Similar to GH, FQGH only needs to access at most two leaf nodes for
each query, therefore it is efficient. Furthermore, the Hilbert sorting is per-
formed based on user locations, and it is oblivious to the query frequencies;
hence, the complexity of FQGH is similar to that of GH. AR, DH and TD
can be extended to accommodate FQR in a similar manner. However, in
practice, query frequency distribution is expected to be skewed, in which
case partitioning techniques that require the retrieval of the entire PN sub-
tree (e.g., AR, DH, TD) are not practical because a much larger number of
users than K are required to achieve SKA. We experimentally verify this
claim in the next section.
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4.5 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented a C++ prototype of the anonymizer and deployed it on
an Intel Xeon 2.8GHz machine running Linux OS. The anonymizer in-
dexes the user locations, which are taken from the NA dataset (available
at www.rtreeportal.org) containing 569k intersections of the North Amer-
ican road network. K ranges from 10 to 1, 000. In each experiment, we
generate 1, 000 queries originating at random users. Effectiveness is mea-
sured as the average ASR area, expressed as a percentage of the entire
data space. Efficiency is measured in terms of average ASR generation
time. The average cost per random I/O is 5ms. For I/O efficiency, we
implemented Quad-trees using linear representation [2], which is easily em-
beddable into B+-trees. Section 4.5.1 evaluates the partitioning methods
of Section 4.3. Section 4.5.2 compares R-tree Cloak (RC) and Quad-Tree
Cloak (QC) against Hilbert Cloak [39], the only existing method which is
reciprocal (hence secure). In Section 4.5.3 we address the variable query
frequency scenario.
4.5.1 Evaluation of Partitioning Techniques
First, we consider the RC implementation of Reciprocal and compare differ-
ent partition methods (i.e., GH, AR, DH and TD). Figure 4.11 illustrates
the ASR area and generation time as a function of K, using a fixed page
size of 4KB. AR has the clear advantage in terms of ASR area, while GH
and DH both outperform TD. In terms of generation time, GH is consid-
erably faster. Note that generation time exhibits a jump after K = 80 for
all methods except GH. For the 4KB page size, the minimum occupancy of
the underlying R*-tree index is 85. Hence for K ≤ 85, ASRs are generated
within one leaf node (at level 1). As K increases beyond this threshold,
the ASR is created in a partition node PN at level 2. GH retrieves only a
small number of leaf nodes (under PN). On the other hand, AR, DH and
TD need to scan the entire sub-tree of PN , leading to significantly more
I/Os. Furthermore, the processing time, which is a function of the input
size, increases accordingly. For a fixed number of data points under PN ,


























Figure 4.11: R-tree Cloak (RC). Partitioning methods versus K
splits drops (i.e., there are fewer, larger buckets). On the other hand, the
cost of DH increases linearly with K. TD is expensive for partitioning at




























Figure 4.12: Quad-tree Cloak (QC). Partitioning methods versus K
Figure 4.12 repeats the same experiment for the Quad-tree (QC) imple-
mentation of Reciprocal. While the ASR area is similar to RC, the generation
time is considerably higher for QC, due to the lack of balance in the index





























Figure 4.13: RC versus page size
In Figure 4.13 we vary the page size, and measure the ASR area and
generation time for RC, when K = 400. As the page size increases, ASRs
need to span across fewer leaf nodes. Therefore, we expect the effectiveness
to improve, as the good locality properties of the underlying R*-tree index
are better exploited. For page sizes from 2 to 8KB, this is indeed the case.
However, at the transition from 1 to 2KB, GH and DH exhibit an increasing
trend because, for 1KB page size, the K = 400 setting coincides with the
minimum occupancy at level 2. Hence, a point of convergence occurs, which
helps GH and DH to obtain smaller ASRs. A larger page size also trans-
lates into increased generation time, as the cardinality of the partition node
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increases. TD is very expensive for sizes exceeding 2KB (for 8KB page size,
it needs 400sec per query). The cost of AR grows faster than that of DH
due to the recursive splits. GH is rather insensitive to the page size since it


























Figure 4.14: QC versus page size
Figure 4.14 shows the same experiment for QC. Observe that the page
size does not affect the ASR area, since construction only depends on the
Quad-tree hierarchy. On the other hand, a larger page increases the occu-
pancy of leaf nodes, and reduces the I/O cost, as shown in Figure 4.14b (TD
is omitted due to very high values).
Summarizing, among the various local partitioning techniques GH is the
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method of choice when the priority is efficiency. On the other hand, AR is
the best technique in terms of effectiveness. DH offers a trade-off between
the two: it obtains smaller ASR area than GH, and it is usually faster than
AR. The performance of TD is unsatisfactory, as it is extremely expensive
while producing ASRs with quality comparable to GH. Regarding the R-
tree and Quad-tree implementations, they offer similar ASR areas, but RC
is more efficient. Based on the above, RC-GH is the method of choice for
efficiency (e.g., when the anonymizer charges clients according to their usage
and the LBS is a public service) and RC-AR the winner when effectiveness
is more important (e.g., free anonymizer service and expensive LBS). Next,
we compare RC-GH and RC-AR against Hilbert Cloak (HC).
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Figure 4.15: RC-GH and RC-AR versus HC
Figure 4.15 shows the relative performance of RC-GH, RC-AR and HC.
RC-GH is slightly better than HC in terms of ASR size and up to one
order of magnitude faster, as can be observed from the log-scale graph in
Figure 4.15b. Although HC applies a Hilbert sorting method similar to RC-
GH and does not incur the overhead of finding the PN node, it still needs
to retrieve from the disk O(K) leaf entries. In contrast, RC-GH, which
maintains MBR information in the internal nodes, only needs to access two
leaf nodes per query. Note that the RC-GH generation time exhibits an
initial increase with increasing K, as the PN node moves from the leaf
level to level 2. RC-AR generates significantly smaller ASRs, but it is much
slower than both RC-GH and HC.
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Figure 4.16: PN overhead for variable query frequency
As discussed in Section 4.4, local partitioning methods that require load-
ing the entire PN node (e.g., AR, DH, TD) are not I/O and CPU efficient,
when the query frequency distribution is skewed. We support our claim with
an experiment which measures the I/O cost to retrieve the PN node, and
the number of points included in PN . We generated 1, 000 queries, each as-
signed to a user according to the zipf distribution with parameter 0.8. Page
size is 4KB. The results are shown in Figure 4.16. Due to its unbalanced
structure, QC incurs higher I/O cost than RC, and it requires retrieving
the entire dataset for values of K > 600. Although RC incurs less I/O,
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for K > 800, PN corresponds to the root node of the index; therefore, all
points need to be retrieved. Consequently, AR, DH and TD are impractical




























Figure 4.17: RC-FQGH versus HCf
Next, we evaluate RC-FQGH, which is feasible for skewed query distri-
butions because it does not retrieve the entire PN sub-tree. For comparison,
we use a frequency-aware variant of HC (called HCf ), which is similar to
RC-FQGH, except that partitioning is applied to the entire user set, as op-
posed to the PN node. We consider 1, 000 random queries with constant
(Cst), uniform (Unif) and zipf-0.8 distribution (Zipf). Figure 4.17 shows
that, guaranteeing privacy for variable query frequency comes at an addi-
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tional increase in ASR size, which grows with the skewness of the frequency
distribution. RC-FQGH is slightly better in terms of ASR area. On the
other hand, the advantage of the reciprocal framework is clear in terms of
generation time, where RC-FQGH is much faster than HCf for all query
distributions.
4.6 Discussion
Our proposed reciprocal framework for spatial K -anonymity offers a sys-
tematic methodology to enforce SKA on top of index structures which are
already wide-spread in LBS applications. The framework is versatile, and
allows a broad range of partitioning techniques: GH offers excellent effi-
ciency, with an ASR generation time up to one order of magnitude faster
than competitor methods. GH is the ideal choice if the anonymizer service
has limited resources, and handles a large number of queries.
In terms of ASR effectiveness, AR is the method of choice, obtaining
ASRs with roughly 50% the area of those obtained by GH. In scenarios
where the LBS is the bottleneck, or quotas/charges are imposed on users
based on the amount of LBS processing incurred, AR is preferred.
For the variable query frequency setting, the frequency-aware flavor of
GH (FQGH) outperforms the only existing reciprocal (i.e. secure) anony-
mization method - Hilbert Cloak - by up to one order of magnitude in terms
of efficiency, with similar ASR extent.
As stated in the assumptions from Section 2.2, we only employ SKA for
a snapshot of user locations. In this setting, our proposed reciprocal frame-
work guarantees user privacy. However, in the case of continuous queries, an
attacker can correlate information from ASRs generated at different times-
tamps in order to expose the querying user. Later in Section 6 we will
propose a private information retrieval protocol which guarantees privacy in






So far, most existing approaches utilized the centralized architecture of Fig-
ure 1.3, where a trusted anonymizer server acts as an intermediate tier be-
tween the users and the LBS. All users subscribe to the anonymizer and con-
tinuously report their location while they move. Each user sends his query
to the anonymizer, which constructs the appropriate K -ASR and contacts
the LBS. The LBS computes the answer based on the K -ASR, instead of
the exact user location; thus, the response of the LBS is a superset of the
answer. Finally, the anonymizer filters the result from the LBS and returns
the exact answer to the user.
A centralized anonymizing service has the following shortcomings (i) The
anonymizer server is a bottleneck due to handling query requests, frequent
updates of user locations and result post-processing. (ii) The anonymizer
is a single point of failure; the system cannot function without it. (iii)
The complete knowledge of the locations and queries of all users is a serious
security threat, if the anonymizer is compromised. Even if there is no attack,
the centralized anonymizer may be subject to governmental control, and
may be banned or forced to disclose sensitive user information (similar to
the legal case of the Napster file-sharing service).
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In this chapter, we propose distributed architectures for anonymous
location-based queries, which address the problems of centralized solutions.
Mobile users self-organize into a P2P overlay network, and cooperate to as-
semble K -ASRs. The bottleneck of the centralized server is avoided. More-
over, since the state of the system is distributed in many users, distributed
solutions are resilient to attacks.
Our specific contributions are two P2P systems: (i) In Section 5.2, we
introduce Prive´, a hierarchical P2P network that implements the Hilbert
Cloak algorithm presented in Section 3.4. The structure of Prive´ resembles
a distributed B+-tree (each mobile user corresponds to a data point), with
additional annotation to support efficiently the Hilbert-based K -ASR con-
struction. Prive´ offers privacy guarantees for snapshot LBS queries, but
it may exhibit slow response time under heavy load, due to its hierarchical
organization. (ii) In Section 5.3, we present the MobiHide P2P network,
which employs a randomized version of Hilbert Cloak : MobiHide does not
enforce reciprocity, hence it does not offer privacy guarantees under all sce-
narios. Nevertheless, we show that it provides strong privacy in practice,
and its scalability is clearly superior to Prive´. Therefore, our two decen-
tralized solutions offer a trade-off between privacy guarantees and system
scalability.
5.2 Prive´
Figure 5.1 depicts the architecture of Prive´. We assume a large number of
users who carry mobile devices (e.g., mobile phones, PDAs) with embedded
positioning capabilities (e.g., GPS). The devices have processing power and
access the network through a wireless protocol such as WiFi, GPRS or 3G.
Moreover, each device has a unique network identity (e.g., IP address) and
can establish point-to-point communication (e.g., TCP/IP sockets) with any
other device in the system through a base station (i.e., the two devices do
not need to be within communication range of each other). For security
reasons, all communication links are encrypted.
In addition, we assume the existence of a trusted central Certification






















Figure 5.1: Architecture of Prive´
user u must authenticate against the CS and obtain a certificate. Users
having a certificate are trusted by all other users. Typically, a certificate is
valid for a few hours; it can be renewed by recontacting the CS. Apart from
the certificate, the CS returns to u the IP addresses of some users who are
currently in the system. u uses this list to identify an entry point to the
distributed network. Note that the CS does not know the locations of the
users and does not participate in the anonymization process. Therefore the
workload of the CS is low (i.e., no location updates); moreover, it does not
store any sensitive information.
Each user corresponds to a peer. Peers are grouped into clusters, ac-
cording to their location. Within each cluster, peers elect a cluster head,
and the set of heads is grouped recursively to form a tree. To achieve load
balancing, the cluster heads are rotated in a round-robin manner. By defi-
nition, cluster heads belong to multiple levels of the tree. In Figure 5.1, for
instance, there is a two-level hierarchy, where users u2, u3, u8 are the heads
of cluster C1, C2 and C3, respectively; also, u8 is the head of the upper layer
cluster C4.
Assume user u1 asks a query. u1 initiates a distributed procedure to
build a K -ASR, in cooperation with other users (the details of the protocol
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are presented in Section 5.2.3). Once the K -ASR is ready, u1 needs to send
it to the LBS. In order to hide his IP address, u1 uses a pseudonym. To
obtain a pseudonym, any existing service for anonymous web surfing can be
used1.
Note that the pseudonym service does not know the location of any user.
Moreover, the auxiliary users inside the K -ASR collaborate only to hide the
location, but do not know the exact query of u1; therefore, a single point of
attack is avoided.
5.2.1 Hilbert Cloak with a B+-tree index
In Section 3.4, we have described the details of the Hilbert Cloak algorithm,
and mentioned that it can be efficiently implemented with any type of an-
notated index structure. The index must efficiently support the K -ASR
formation operation, which boils down to determining the start and end
values for a certain bucket, as given by eq. (3.1).
In Prive´, we use an annotated B+-tree (similar to the aR-tree [51]),
which stores the number of leaf nodes in each of its subtrees.
Example 5.1. Figure 5.2 shows the application of Hilbert Cloak with an
annotated B+-tree index. For each internal node entry e, we store the num-
ber of leaf entries that are rooted at e; annotation counters are shown in
parentheses. Assume we want to determine a K-ASR for entry 37, with
K = 6. First, we compute the rank of entry 37 (Figure 5.2a): we follow the
path in the tree from root to the leaf that contains 37, and at each internal
node we add to the rank value the sum of all counters in the node situated
at the left of the followed pointer. At the leaf layer, we add to the rank the
local rank value of key 37 in its leaf, and obtain rank 8 (ranks start from
0). Then, we calculate the bucket delimiters using eq. (3.1), and obtain the
interval [6..11]. Next (Figure 5.2b), we perform a range search to locate the
entries with ranks [6..11]. Observe that this operation uses the annotation
counters, rather than the B+-tree keys. Sub-ranges at each level are deter-
1Since each user can access his preferred pseudonym service, that service is not a bottle-
neck or a single point of failure. The pseudonym, as opposed to the location anonymizer,
does not need to pool together a large number of users
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Figure 5.2: Hilbert Cloak with Annotated B+-tree
mined by splitting the initial range based on subtree sizes; the offset for the
recursive call at entry e is determined as the initial start value minus the
sum of counters of all entries in the node preceding e. The resulting K-ASR
is highlighted in the diagram.
The data structure is scalable, since the complexity of constructing the
K -ASR is O(logN+ K ), whereas search, insert and delete cost is O(logN).
5.2.2 Protocol Overview
Prive´ mimics the functionality of a B+-tree in a distributed setting. Each
mobile user u has an associated index entry consisting of an ID (e.g., IP
address), and the Hilbert value H(u) of his location as index key. A node
(leaf or internal) in the B+-tree corresponds to a cluster of users, with size
bounded between α and 3α, where α is a fixed system parameter. We use
the terms cluster and index node interchangeably. The maximum cluster
size is 3α, instead of the usual 2α for B+-trees, to prevent cascading splits
and merges (i.e., a split followed by a user departure), which are costly in
the distributed environment.
Every user belongs to a leaf level cluster (level 0), and the contents of
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Figure 5.3: Distributed Index Structure, α=2
each cluster are disjoint (see Figure 5.3). The users of each cluster C elect a
leader called head(C). The head (marked with an asterisk) handles all index
operations on behalf of the users in the cluster. Cluster heads are recursively
grouped to form a tree; therefore, they belong to multiple levels of the tree.
We denote by Ciu, the level i cluster which includes user u. In our example,
user ua is the head of cluster C0a at level 0, and also the head of clusters
C1a and C
2
a ; therefore, it belongs to every level of the tree. There is a single
cluster at the top of the hierarchy, denoted as top. The cluster head of top
is denoted by root (ua in the example). In our protocol description, we use
remote procedure call convention to specify interactions between users. The
notation u.func(params) denotes the invocation of subroutine func with
parameters params at user u.
Each cluster is associated with its state information. The state of a
leaf level cluster consists of an ordered list of (IP address, H(u)) pairs (user
coordinates can be derived from theH(u) value). The state of an upper layer
cluster with m elements consists of a list of m user addresses, separated
by m − 1 key values used to direct the search; the process is similar to
a B+-tree, with the role of memory pointers fulfilled by the IP addresses
of users. Each internal node entry is annotated with a counter (depicted in
parentheses) representing the total number of users at the subtree under the
entry. Only the head needs to know the state of the cluster. However, in
our implementation, we replicate the state on every user within the cluster,
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Table 5.1: Prive´ Protocol Terminology
Notation Definition
Ciu level i cluster user u belongs to
head(C) cluster leader of cluster C
parent(C) the parent-cluster of cluster C
top the cluster at the top of the hierarchy
root head(top)
u.func(params) RPC call for func at user u
to improve fault tolerance (in Section 5.4, we discuss the tradeoff between
fault tolerance and maintenance cost). The Prive´ hierarchy has at most
logαN layers, where N is the total number of users. Since the cluster size is
bounded and a user may belong to at most one cluster at each level, there
is an upper bound of O(α logαN) on the membership state stored at a user.
The Prive´ protocol terminology is summarized in Table 5.1.
5.2.3 Protocol Operations
The index supports four operations: join, departure, relocation and K-
request (i.e., a request for a K -ASR with anonymization degree K ). We
establish two performance metrics for Prive´: (i) latency : the number of
hops an index operation requires to complete. The latency is equal to the
longest tree path followed as a result of the operation. Multiple paths may
be followed in parallel during an operation. (ii) communication cost : the
number of messages generated by an index operation.
Join. User join corresponds to a B+-tree insertion operation. Newly joining
users authenticate at the certification server and receive the address of a
user already inside the system. Without loss of generality, we assume that
joining users know the root, since the root can be reached from any user
in O(logαN) cost. We stress that since we require an index structure with
annotation (in order to determine the absolute ranks of users), all joins must
occur through the root. To avoid overloading the root, we devise a load-
balancing mechanism (Section 5.2.4). User join has O(logαN) complexity
in terms of latency and O(logαN +α) communication cost; the second term
is for updating the cluster state in all the users of the affected cluster.
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Figure 5.4: User Join and Relocation, α=2
Consider user uy with Hilbert value H(uy) = 46 that joins the index
of Figure 5.3: uy contacts ua (at the root level) who forwards the join
request to ub and updates ub’s annotation counter in C2a to 14. ub then
forwards the request to uh, whose annotation counter in C1b is updated to 4.
Figure 5.4(a) shows the join outcome. User join may trigger a cluster split,
handled similarly to a B+-tree node split; the head initiating the split leads
one of the resulting clusters, and appoints a random initial cluster node to
lead the other.
Departure (informed). User departure is similar to a B+-tree deletion.
The effect of deletion must be propagated to root to update the annotation
counters. Deletion has O(logαN) latency and O(logαN + α) communica-
tion cost. If the cluster size decreases below α, the head triggers a merge
operation with the neighbor leaf-level cluster that has fewer members (to
avoid a cascaded split). The head of the resulting cluster can be any of the
initial heads, except if one of them (e.g., ua) is also head at the higher level.
If so, ua will be chosen as leader, to minimize membership changes.
Relocation. User mobility is treated as an entry update, which in a B+-
tree translates into a deletion and an insertion. Since users are likely to
change location often, we optimize this process by performing local reas-
signment of users to nearby clusters. Due to the good locality properties of
Hilbert ordering, the number of clusters involved in relocation is likely to be
small. Annotation counter updates are only performed by affected clusters;
this way, updates are not propagated all the way to the root. The upper
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u.RelocateMyself() /*executed by moving user*/
determine new key value Hu = Hilbert(u.x, u.y)
call head(C0u).Relocate(u,Hu,0)
u.Relocate(relocated user,H,l)
if (H in indexed key range at level l )
if (l = 0)
add relocated user to leaf user list; return
else
let n be the next hop for H
call n.Relocate(relocated user,H,l − 1)
else
call head(parent(Clu)).Relocate(relocated user,H,l + 1)
Figure 5.5: User Relocation Pseudocode
bound on relocation latency is O(logαN), but in most cases relocation only
involves a few clusters, at the low layers of the index. The pseudocode for
user relocation is given in Figure 5.5.
Consider user us from Figure 5.3 who relocates to a new position with
Hilbert value 60. He forwards the request to ua = head(C0s ). ua cannot keep
us within the same leaf entry, since the new value is outside the interval
[49..55]. Since ua = head(C1a), with no additional message, ua decides that
us can be relocated to C0f , forwards the request to uf and updates the
annotation counters of ua and uf accordingly. Figure 5.4(b) illustrates the
relocation outcome.
K -request. This operation corresponds to the Hilbert Cloak algorithm
described in Section 5.2.1. Consider the example in Figure 5.6, where user
um issues a K -request with K=6. The request follows the path: um → ud →
ub → ua (solid arrows in Figure 5.6(a)). The root ua determines the K -
bucket (i.e., start = 6, end = 11) and sends a K -ASR request to ub (dotted
arrows in Figure 5.6(a)). ub sends in parallel requests for partial K -ASRs
with ranges [6..6], [7..9] and [10..11] to ud, ue and uh, respectively. ub, which
is the head of the lowest-layer cluster that completely covers the K -bucket
(shown hashed in Figure 5.6(b)) collects the partial K -ASRs, assembles the
final query K -ASR and sends it back to the query issuer on the reverse
path of the request. Note that, the cluster head that covers the K -bucket
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Figure 5.6: K -request, α=2, K=6
sustains the highest load among all other users involved in the query. This
potential load imbalance issue is addressed in Section 5.2.4. A K -request
has O(logαN)+O(logαK) latency and O(logαN)+O(K/α) communication
cost. The pseudocode for K -request is shown in Figure 5.7. Once the K -
ASR is constructed, the query issuer (i.e., um) can send the anonymized
query to the LBS through any preferred pseudonym service.
5.2.4 Fault Tolerance and Load Balancing
Prive´ implements a soft-state based mechanism to deal with user failures
or disconnections without notification2. Each cluster leader sends period-
ically (i.e., every δt seconds) a membership update message to all cluster
members. The message contains the membership list of the current cluster
C and that of parent(C). Cluster members respond to these messages; if a
cluster member does not respond to two consecutive messages, it is consid-
ered disconnected and removed from the cluster. The change is broadcast
by the cluster head to the remaining cluster members.
If a non-head cluster member u does not receive a membership update
from its head for a 2δt period, it initiates a leader election process. Alterna-
tively, when u attempts to initiate a operation, such as query or relocation,
but cannot contact the cluster head for two consecutive attempts, it trig-
gers the leader election protocol without waiting for the timer to expire. u
2Similar fault-tolerance and load-balancing mechanisms have also been proposed for
hierarchical wireless networks [11]
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u.K -request() /*executed by query source*/
determine key value Hu = Hilbert(u.x, u.y)
call head(C0u).ForwardRequest(Hu, 0, 0)
u.ForwardRequest(H, count, l)
if (l = 0) count = rankH in leaf entry
else count+ = sum of annotation counters of keys < H
if (u is root)
compute start and end using eq (3.1)
K -ASR = root.findMBR(start, end, root height)
else call head(Cl+1u ).ForwardRequest(H, count, l + 1)
u.findMBR(start,end,l)
if (l = 0) /*leaf level*/
return MBR of members with local rank in [start,end]
find set of next hops U for range [start,end]
MBR = ∅
for u′ ∈ U
MBR =MBR ∪ u′.findMBR(startu′ , endu′ , l − 1)
return MBR
Figure 5.7: K -request
checks the membership it had at the last update, and chooses as leader (i.e.,
new head) the user with the smallest identifier. It then sends a transfer head
message to new head, which in turn sends a membership update message to
all cluster users and also contacts head(parent(C)) to notify the change in
leadership. new head will replace the old head in all layers where the latter
was leader before disconnection.
The hierarchical structure can cause significant differences between the
load sustained by cluster heads and ordinary cluster members, as well as
among cluster heads at different layers of the hierarchy. To alleviate the
inherent imbalance, we propose a cluster head rotation mechanism, where
users take turns in fulfilling the cluster head role. Since the promotion to
cluster head translates into presence at a higher layer of the hierarchy, the
rotation also ensures that users equally share the load at different layers.
Rotation is triggered when a node reaches a certain load threshold, de-
noted by load unit. In wireless devices, the communication cost is dominant.
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Figure 5.8: Load Balancing Mechanism
It is also important from the user’s perspective, since mobile phone oper-
ators charge by the amount of transferred data. Therefore, in Prive´ the
load is best represented by the number of messages sent and received by the
user.
When user u reaches one load unit, it triggers a head rotation in all the
clusters it currently heads, starting with its highest layer. For each node
along the path to its level 0 cluster, the member with the least load is ap-
pointed as new head. Note that, since u stores the membership state about
all clusters it belongs to at different layers, the appointment of a new leader
can be done directly by u, without the need for a complex protocol or addi-
tional messages. Choosing the cluster member with the lowest load prevents
the newly appointed head to start a fresh rotation soon after promotion.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the rotation mechanism. For simplicity, all clusters
have size 2. Assume all queries originate at user ud with K=4. After
ua reaches one load unit, it hands over the root role to ue (at layer 2)
from the right-hand subtree. Also, at layer 1, uc becomes the head and is
automatically promoted to layer 2. Similarly, at layer 0, ub becomes the
head and is promoted to layer 1; the result is shown in Figure 5.8(b). Next,
uc reaches its load unit, because more requests pass through it (it must
inject queries and collect partial K -ASRs). uc triggers a rotation at level 1
and appoints ub as cluster head (see Figure 5.8(c)). Subsequently, ub may be
the next one to reach the load threshold, and start a new rotation in the left
subtree. Observe that at step (d), the left subtree has already performed
a complete rotation round, whereas the right subtree has only performed
one change. Hence, our rotation mechanism alleviates hotspots (an entire
subtree shares the load generated by ud) and at the same time provides a
degree of fairness, not allowing a localized hotspot to affect a large partition
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Figure 5.9: Hilbert sequence ring
of the index.
The granularity of load unit choice is important in practice, in order to
achieve a good tradeoff between load balancing and communication cost,
since a rotation may incur a number of messages as large as O(α logαN).
In practice, the load unit value can be set to a multiple of the rotation cost,
i.e. β × α logαN , where β ∈ N. This way, the communication overhead of
changing cluster leaders will not exceed an 1/β fraction of the usual protocol
operation cost.
5.3 MobiHide
In this section, we introduce MobiHide, a P2P system which employs a
randomized K -ASR construction technique to offer query source anonymity,
and is scalable to a large number of mobile users. Similar to Prive´, Mobi-
Hide is using the Hilbert ordering of the users’ locations. However, instead
of grouping users into fixed partitions, it forms a K -ASR by randomly choos-
ing K consecutive users, including the querying user.
Let [u1, . . . , uN ] be the sequence of all users, ordered by their Hilbert
value. To allow random K -ASR selection for the users at the start and
end of the sequence, the 1-D space becomes a ring (or torus), instead of an
array. Therefore, u1 is after uN (and uN is before u1). Figure 5.9 presents an
example, where uq is the user who issues a query. There areK ways to choose
a set of consecutive K users which includes uq: [uq−K+1 : uq], [uq−K+2 :
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Figure 5.10: K -ASR construction in MobiHide
uq+1], . . . , [uq : uq+K−1]. This is equivalent to choosing a random offset
l ∈ [0, K−1], representing the offset of uq in the resulting sequence. For
example, if l = 0, the resulting sequence is [uq : uq+K−1]. Observe that
we only need information in the neighborhood of uq in order to select the
sequence (as opposed to Prive´, which needs the global ranking). Therefore,
MobiHide works in a fully decentralized manner, and can be deployed on
top of a scalable structure such as Chord.
Example 5.2. Figure 5.10 shows the MobiHide K-ASR construction,
where u2 is the querying user. Let K = 4 and assume that u2 randomly se-
lects offset l = 2. According to the Hilbert ordering, the resulting sequence of
users is [u10, u1, u2, u3]. The corresponding K-ASR is the minimum bound-
ing rectangle (MBR) which encloses these four users. In this particular
example it was necessary to wrap around the Hilbert sequence (from u10 to
u1). Observe that the “jump” in Euclidean distance due to wrapping, is not
necessarily larger than other “jumps” that may occur within the sequence
(e.g., from user u8 to u9). Therefore, the average size of the K-ASRs (thus
the query cost) is not affected significantly by wrapping. We investigate
further this issue experimentally in Section 5.4.
Theorem 5.3. If all users issue queries with the same probability (i.e.,
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uniform distribution), MobiHide guarantees query anonymity.
Proof. Denote by PQ the probability of a user issuing a query (same for
all users). The query source generates a random offset l ∈ [0, K−1]; we
denote by 〈u, l〉 the event of user u generating a set of users with offset l.
The probability P〈u,l〉 = PQ/K. Refer to Figure 5.9, where uq is issuing a
query. Obviously, uq must belong to the set associated to his query. To
guarantee anonymity, the probability of identifying uq as the query source
must not exceed 1/K. We denote by Aq any set of users that includes uq,
and by PAq the probability of such a set being generated. We denote by
Pui the probability of user ui being the source of the query associated with
Aq. Then, Pui > 0 only for users [uq−K+1 : uq+K−1], and by symmetry,
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hence user uq is K -anonymous.
5.3.1 The Correlation Attack
In practice, the query distribution is not always uniform. In the extreme
case, the same user (e.g., uq) would send all queries and he would be included
in all K -ASRs. An attacker can intersect the K -ASRs and pinpoint uq as the
querying user with high probability. It is more realistic, however, that many
users ask queries, even if the query distribution is skewed. In this case,
intersecting the K -ASRs is unlikely to compromise the system, since the
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random sequence selection inMobiHide distributes the anonymized regions
in the entire space. In order to succeed, the attacker should know the exact
locations of all users, to be able to reconstruct the Hilbert sequence. Then,
he could find the users included in each K -ASR by reverse-engineering the
K -ASR construction mechanism, and speculate that the users who appear
more frequently are the ones who issued the queries.
Consider the extreme case where the attacker knows the exact location
of all users and intercepts the set R of K -ASRs. We formalize the corre-
lation attack as follows: (i) Construct a histogram F with the number of
occurrences of every user in any of the queries. (ii) For each R ∈ R: infer
the query source as the user in R with the highest number of occurrences in
F .
The correlation attack gives an attacker powerful means to infer the
query source. Prive´ guarantees anonymization against this type of attack,
but as discussed in Section 5.1, may not scale well as the number of users
increases. MobiHide cannot offer theoretical guarantees when the query
distribution is extremely skewed. However, we believe that in practice this
attack is hard to stage, since it is difficult for an attacker to know the exact
locations of all users at each snapshot. Furthermore, we show experimen-
tally (Section 5.4) that the probability of identifying the querying user in
MobiHide is very close to the theoretical bound 1/K , even if the attacker
knows all users’ locations and the query distribution is skewed. Finally, ob-
serve that MobiHide does not suffer from the center-of-ASR attack (see
Section 2.2) because, by construction, the probability of uq to be closest to
the center of the K -ASR is 1/K .
5.3.2 Protocol Overview
MobiHide users organize themselves into a Chord [57] P2P system. Chord
is a Distributed Hash Table (DHT), where each peer (or node) has an m-
bit key (the Hilbert value in our case), and it stores a routing table with
pointers to other nodes (see Figure 5.11). The routing table at peer n with
key keyn consists of:
• a successor and predecessor pointer to the node with the key that
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Figure 5.11: MobiHide implementation over Chord
immediately follows (respectively, precedes) keyn on the ring
• a successor list, used mainly for fault tolerance, with a list of consec-
utive peers that follow n on the ring
• a finger table, withm pointers to nodes that are situated at 2i distances
from n (i = 0, 1, ..,m− 1}.
We denote by H(u) the Chord key of user u. Assume that each user
is mapped to a distinct Chord node. When user u wants to pose a query,
he initiates the K -ASR construction procedure, denoted by K-request. u
generates a random offset l ∈ [0, K−1], and contacts the set P of l prede-
cessors and the set S of K−1− l successors on the Chord ring. The resulting
K -ASR is the MBR that encloses users in P ∪ S ∪ {u}. The complexity of
a K -request is O(K ) overlay hops.
Since K can be large (e.g., 50-100) in practice, we wish to reduce the
number of hops, and hence the latency of K -request. We introduce an addi-
tional level of hierarchy, such that each overlay node represents a cluster of
users, rather than a single user. Similar to Prive´, each cluster has between
α and 3α-1 users, where α is a system parameter. If the cluster reaches 3α,
a split is performed and an additional ring node is created. If the size falls
below α, a merge operation with another overlay node is performed3. We
chose 3α, instead of 2α, as the upper bound on size, to minimize frequent
3Obviously, if more keys fall within a Chord segment, there will also be proportionally
more nodes in that segment; therefore, hot-spots are avoided.
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merge and split operations. Each cluster has a representative, or cluster
head, which is part of the Chord ring. In the example of Figure 5.11, u12 is
the head of cluster {u8, u11, u12}. The head’s key on the ring is the maxi-
mum of all keys inside its cluster, in order to preserve the key ordering on
the ring. The cluster membership is maintained by the head, and is repli-
cated to all cluster members, to enhance fault-tolerance. Heads are rotated
periodically to achieve load-balancing. We denote by Cu the cluster that
contains user u, and by CHu the head of Cu.
We further describe how various operations are performed inMobiHide.
5.3.3 Protocol Operations
Similar to Prive´, for each operation, we consider two performance metrics:
(i) latency: the time to completion, measured as the number of overlay hops
on the longest path followed. Multiple paths may be followed in parallel. (ii)
communication cost: the communication cost of an operation, measured as
the number of transmitted messages (communication cost typically prevails
over CPU cost).
Join and Departure. User join is illustrated in Figure 5.12a. User u
with key H(u) = 71 authenticates at the certification server4 and receives
the address of user ubs inside the system. ubs issues a search for key H(u),
which returns the address of u85, the successor of 71 on the ring. u contacts
u85 and joins cluster C. Hence, Cu ≡ C and CHu ≡ u85. Upon u’s join,
CHu checks the new size of cluster Cu, and if size(Cu) = 3α, CHu splits
his cluster into two halves, in increasing order of key values. He appoints
one of his cluster members, CH ′u, as head of the newly formed cluster. All
nodes in the initial cluster are notified. CHu and CH ′u also notify their
predecessor and successor on the ring. CH ′u inherits a large part (if not all)
of the finger table of CHu; the rest of the table is determined through the
Chord stabilization process [57].
In our example, the new size of C is 6 and α = 2, so u85 triggers a
split operation (Figure 5.12b). u85 divides his cluster C into two halves,
4MobiHide uses the same architectural components as shown in Figure 5.1 for Prive´,
except that the user organization is different
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Figure 5.12: Join and Split, α=2
C ′ with members 61, 67 and 71, and C ′′ with members 74, 82 and 85.
u71 is appointed as head of C ′, while u85 remains head for C ′′. u85 sets his
predecessor pointer to u71, and notifies the former predecessor u52 to change
its successor from u85 to u71. The complexity of join is O(logN − logα)
latency and O(logN − logα+ α) communication cost (the last term stands
for notifying all cluster members).
User u can depart gracefully, or fail; failure is addressed in Section 5.3.4.
When u departs gracefully, he notifies his cluster head CHu, who updates
the cluster membership. If the departing node is cluster head, he appoints
one of his members as new head. A merge can be triggered by departure.
In this case, user CHu triggering the merge contacts randomly either his
successor s or predecessor p on the Chord ring to merge5. CHu transfers his
members (including himself) to the merging peer and ceases to be cluster
head. All members are notified and the successor and predecessor pointers
are updated.
Relocation. When user u moves to a new location, his Hilbert value H(u)
changes. If the new H ′(u) falls within the key range of other users in cluster
Cu, u only needs to inform his cluster head of the key change. Otherwise,
u performs a graceful departure followed by a join. Since Hilbert ordering
preserves locality, it is likely that the relocation will be within a small dis-
tance from the initial ring position. The worst case complexity of relocation
5Alternatively, an interrogation phase can find which of s or p has fewer members, and
merge with that one (to avoid cascaded splits and to equalize cluster sizes).
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u.findASR(H,K )
compute rankH in sorted order of Cu
generate random offset l
before = max(0,l - rankH)
after = max(0,K -l + rankH − size(Cu))
if (after > 0)
succ.FwdReq(after,1)
if (before > 0)
pred.FwdReq(before,−1)
wait for partial MBRs




if (direction == 1) /*Look Forward*/
return MBR of first count keys
if (count > size(Cu))
succ.FwdReq(count− size(Cu),1)
else /*Look Backward*/
return MBR of last count keys
if (count > size(Cu))
pred.FwdReq(count− size(Cu),−1)
Figure 5.13: Pseudocode for K -Request
is O(logN − logα) latency and O(logN − logα+ α) communication cost.
K -request. To generate a K -ASR, u forwards a K -request to his cluster
head CHu (unless u himself is the cluster head). CHu generates a random
offset l ∈ [0, K−1]. Then, CHu examines the membership list of his cluster
Cu and determines how many users in Cu will belong to the K -ASR. CHu
computes the values before and after corresponding to the number of users
in K -ASR that are outside Cu and precede (respectively, follow) the set of
keys in Cu. CHu issues a request for the MBR6 of these members to his
predecessor p and successor s. In p and s the same procedure is followed
recursively, until K users are found. CHu waits for all answers, and assem-
bles the K -ASR as the union of the received MBRs. The pseudocode for
K -request is given in Figure 5.13. The complexity is O(K/α) in terms of
both latency and communication cost. Once the K -ASR is assembled, u can
submit it to the LBS using his preferred pseudonym service.
5.3.4 Fault-tolerance and Load Balancing
MobiHide inherits the good fault-tolerance properties of Chord [57]. Simi-
lar to Chord, some of the pointers to other peers (i.e., successor and prede-
cessor pointers, the successor list and the finger table) may be temporarily
corrupted (e.g., when a user fails). Such pointers are corrected periodically
through a stabilization process. In addition to stabilization, MobiHide
6CHu only acquires the MBR, not the exact location of users in other clusters.
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Figure 5.14: Leader Election Protocol
implements an intra-cluster maintenance mechanism. Each cluster head pe-
riodically (i.e., every δt seconds) checks if all cluster members are alive, by
sending beacon messages; beacons contain the current cluster membership
in addition to the successor and predecessor nodes of the head on the Chord
ring. If a user fails to respond for 2δt seconds, he is considered failed and is
removed from the cluster. Similarly, a non-head node that does not receive
a beacon from his head for 2δt seconds, concludes that the head has failed
and initiates a leader election protocol (see Figure 5.14). The RecoveryState
(RS) variable of each node indicates whether the node is in normal operation
(RS = 0) or participates in the election protocol. Since the cluster member-
ship is replicated at all cluster nodes, recovery is facilitated. Upon detecting
leader failure, node n enters the RS = 1 state, sends a candidate(n.IP )
message to all peers in the cluster and sets an election timer large enough to
allow other peers to respond to the candidature proposal. When a node re-
ceives the candidate(IP ) message, it initiates its own candidature only if its
address is smaller than IP ; otherwise, it enters the RS = 2 state and waits
for a setParent message. The user with the smallest address declares him-
self leader and notifies all other cluster members, as well as the predecessor
and successor on the ring.
To prevent unequal load sharing, a simple rotation mechanism is en-
forced among cluster members. The rotation is triggered when a certain
load threshold is reached. This threshold is measured in terms of number
of messages sent/received, since the communication cost is predominant in
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terms of both energy consumption and fees payed to the service provider.
When the cluster head CH transfers leadership to another cluster member
CH ′, he transfers his routing state on the Chord ring and the cluster mem-
bership to CH ′. Observe that the Chord key does not change, since it is the
maximum key among all cluster members. Therefore, the overhead for the




To evaluate our distributed anonymization protocols, we have implemented
event-driven packet level simulators in C++. Our Prive´ implementation
is developed on top of the NICE [10] protocol suite for multicast delivery
networks. For MobiHide, we have used the Chord DHT [57] implementa-
tion in the p2psim [1] suite, a packet-level simulator for P2P systems. Since
we are mostly interested in the overlay-layer performance, we consider a full
mesh topology with lossless 500ms round-trip time links between any pair
of users. Furthermore, we only consider packet loss as an effect of queueing
at the processing nodes, and not as a result of link faults. Our workload
consists of user locations and movement patterns, and is generated using the
Network-based Generator of Moving Objects [17], which models user move-
ment on public road networks. We consider user velocities ranging from 18
to 68km/h. We present our results for a data set consisting of the San Fran-
cisco bay area (Figure 5.15), with number of users N varying from 1, 000
to 10, 000. We vary the anonymization degree K from 10 to 160. We con-
sider both uniform and Zipfian distributions of queries over the set of users.
If not stated differently, we set α = 5 (see Section 5.2.2 and 5.3.2). We
compare Prive´ and MobiHide against the only other existing distributed
spatial anonymization system, CloakP2P [21]. In Section 5.4.1 we evalu-
ate the Prive´ protocol, whereas in Section 5.4.2 we evaluate MobiHide.





























(b) Cost vs α
Figure 5.16: Prive´ Join/Leave Operation
5.4.1 Prive´ protocol
Join and Departure. In a system with N users, we perform 0.1N ran-
dom user joins, followed by 0.1N random user departures. Figure 5.16(a)
shows the join latency measured as hop count from the time a user issues
a join request until he receives a join response message from its leaf-level
head. We observe that the latency is lower than the theoretical 1 + logαN ,
as a user may appear in multiple levels and can avoid sending redundant
messages to himself. The communication cost (i.e., total messages) per join































(b) Cost vs α
Figure 5.17: Prive´ K-request Operation
ery join/departure translates into a membership update broadcast message
within one leaf-level cluster. Note the role of α in the latency-cost trade-
off: an increase of α decreases latency as logαN , but triggers a linear cost
increase in membership notification. A larger α also increases the cost of
periodic cluster membership maintenance.
K -request. Figure 5.17(a) and 5.17(b) show the K -request latency and
communication cost for varying α, where K=40. Larger α decreases the
latency as the height of the index decreases. The communication cost also



































(b) Query Cost vs K
Figure 5.18: Prive´ K-request Operation
the K -ASR. However, α cannot grow very large from index maintenance
considerations. Figure 5.18(a) and 5.18(b) show the latency and communi-
cation cost variation with anonymization degree K, α = 5. Latency is only
marginally affected by K (the dominant factor in latency is logαN , since in





























(b) Percentage vs α
Figure 5.19: Prive´ Percentage of users involved in query
The percentage of the user population involved in answering a single
K -request operation is shown in Figure 5.19(a) and 5.19(b). For small N
values, at most 2% of all users are needed to answer a K -request, while for
larger N , less than 0.5% of the users are required.
Relocation. Prive´ addresses user mobility by using an index update algo-
rithm that attempts to resolve relocation at the lower levels of the hierarchy,
in order to reduce both latency and communication cost. In our simulated
scenario, we consider 10, 000 users across 20 consecutive time frames, with



































Figure 5.20: Prive´ Relocation
locities: 68, 40 and 18km/h. Figure 5.20(a) and 5.20(b) show that relocation
is efficiently handled: for the moderate α = 10 value, the relocation is done
on average in 2.5 hops for fast-moving users and 1.5 hops for slow-moving
users. The dominant communication cost is that of the membership change
propagation; for α = 10 this cost is roughly a quarter compared to the cost































Figure 5.22: Prive´ Failure Recovery
Fig 5.21 shows the frequency of relocations completed at various levels
of the hierarchy for a 6-level, α = 3, 10, 000 users system. Most relocations
are solved at the low levels of the hierarchy: for slow movement, 70% are
solved at the leaf level and 86% at levels 0 and 1; for fast movement, 32% of
relocations are completed at the leaf level, 63% at levels 0 and 1, and 86%
at levels 0, 1 or 2.
Fault-tolerance. Starting with a system having correct cluster member-
ship, we fail simultaneously 10, 20 or 30% of the nodes. We use maintenance
timer values of 30 seconds for refreshing cluster membership and 60 seconds
for purging a failed member. Figure 5.22 shows the evolution of member-





























(b) Absolute Node Load
Figure 5.23: Prive´ Load Balancing
system recovers to a correct state within 3 purge cycles (138 sec) for 10%
failure and 4 purge cycles (197 sec) for 30% failure.
Load-balancing. We measure the load incurred by each user for a 10, 000
users system, α = 5, K=80, load unit = 200 messages (load unit is discussed
in Section 5.2.4) and a simulated time of 1 hour, during which an average of
8 queries/user were generated. We consider both uniform and skewed (Zipf
0.8) query source distribution. Figure 5.23(a) shows the cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF) of sorted user loads. The load is highly unbalanced
if no rotation is performed, with 10% of users sustaining more than 80% of
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the load. With rotation, for uniform query distribution, the load is close
to the ideal one (i.e., diagonal line). For skewed query distribution, most
of the users share equal load, while part of the users (roughly 10%) share
a slightly higher load, as dictated by the fairness requirement discussed in
Section 5.2.4. This is illustrated better in Figure 5.23(b) which shows the










































Figure 5.24: MobiHide Join
5.4.2 MobiHide protocol
Join. In this experiment, we measure the latency (i.e., number of hops)
and communication cost (i.e., total number of messages) for the user join
operation. Starting from a stable system, an additional 10% of the initial
user population joins randomly the system. Figure 5.24(a) shows the latency
for N = 1K, 2K, 5K and 10K users, for varying α (recall that the cluster size
is between α and 3α). The plot confirms the theoretical expected complexity
O(logN − logα). For low α values, we observe a slight increase, due to the
increasing proportion of split operations. In terms of communication cost


















































Figure 5.25: MobiHide K -Request Operation
notification. There is a tradeoff between join latency and communication
cost in terms of α. For low α values, the cluster maintenance cost is lower,
but the latency increases. Furthermore, a low α also causes increased latency
and communication cost during K -requests, as we will show shortly. Our
experiments suggest that a value 5 < α < 10 is likely to yield good results
in practice.
K -Request. We consider a 10K user population with 10K uniformly dis-
tributed queries. Figure 5.25(a) and 5.25(b) show the average latency and

















Figure 5.26: MobiHide Load Balancing
and communication cost are favored by larger α values. However, a compro-
mise must be reached among the K -Request performance, maintenance cost
and system scalability. Larger α determines higher maintenance cost and
also yields a more centralized system, with inferior peak-load performance.
Load Balancing. Due to the hierarchical nature of MobiHide, the cluster
heads that participate on the Chord ring bear more load than other cluster
members. Here, we evaluate the rotation mechanism of MobiHide which
aims at distributing the load evenly. We set α=5, K=20 and simulated a
10K user network, where an average of 3.6quh are generated. The total
simulated time is 3 hours, and a rotation is triggered at every 300 messages
received by a node. Figure 5.26 shows the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the sorted node loads. Without rotation, the roughly 1,000 cluster
heads (i.e., 10000/2α as 2α is the average cluster size) bear 90% of the system
load. With rotation, the load balancing is very close to the ideal (i.e., linear
CDF, plotted as dotted line). Note that, for a load unit setting of 300 and
a rotation cost of 2α messages, the rotation overhead is only 2α/300 = 3%.
This overhead can be decreased further by increasing the load unit.
Fault Tolerance. In this experiment we evaluate the fault-tolerance fea-
tures of MobiHide. We consider 10K users and α=5. Chord performs
periodical maintenance for its pointers. The respective timers are set at

























Figure 5.27: MobiHide Fault Tolerance
the finger table pointers. The intra-cluster beacon timer δt = 10sec. We
consider three network correctness metrics: (i) the intra-cluster correctness,
measured as the ratio of correct cluster membership entries out of the total
entries, (ii) the succ/pred correctness, measured as the ratio of correct suc-
cessors/predecessors over the total number of successor/predecessor point-
ers, and (iii) we define similarly the correctness of finger tables. Note that,
for correct execution ofK -request operations, only the successor/predecessor
and intra-cluster membership need to be 100% accurate; the finger table
pointers are only used for join and relocation operations, and their inac-
curacy can only cause a slight increase in latency. Figure 5.27 shows the
evolution in time of the three metrics, starting with a correct network, when
25% of the users fail simultaneously; t = 0 is the time of failure. We observe
that the succ/pred and intra-cluster correctness are established after 60sec.
For the intra-cluster correctness, it takes the system roughly three purge
intervals (6δt) to detect head failure, elect new leaders and establish correct
cluster membership. The finger table is restored after 120sec.
5.4.3 Prive´ and MobiHide Comparison
Anonymity Strength.
In Section 3.4, we have proved that Hilbert Cloak guarantees anonymity
against location-based attacks, under any query distribution. Furthermore,
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in Section 5.3, we proved theoretically thatMobiHide guaranteesK -anonymity
for uniform query distribution.
First, we focus on the center-of-ASR attack, and we show a head-to-head
comparison of MobiHide and Prive´ against CloakP2P [21]. We assume
that an attacker knows (from an external source) the locations of all users,
and employs a simple strategy which infers the query source as uc, the user
who is nearest to the center of the K -ASR. We consider a 10, 000 users sce-
nario in which 10, 000 random queries are issued, according to a Zipf (i.e.,
skewed) query distribution with ϑ = 0.8. In Figure 5.28(a) we plot the prob-
ability of uc being the query source, for various values of K . The dotted line
represents the value 1/K ; ideally, the performance of the algorithms should
be under that line. For CloakP2P , if K=40, the probability of uc being the
query source is 10%, four times the 1/K=2.5% maximum allowed bound.
For larger values of K, the situation gets worse, as the number of users in-
cluded in the K -ASR increases. The users are likely to come uniformly from
all directions; hence, uc is disclosed as the query source. On the other hand,
Prive´ and MobiHide always satisfy the privacy bound. Note that, even
if the anonymizing sets contain exactly K users, the corresponding MBRs
may enclose a few more. This is why the results for Prive´ and MobiHide
are not identical to the 1/K line.
In Figure 5.28(b) we consider the correlation attack (see Section 5.3.1).
We assume the extreme case, where the attacker knows the exact locations
of all users (recall that this attack is unlikely to occur in practice). We
show the results for uniform and Zipf query distribution, with ϑ = 0.5
and ϑ = 0.8. As expected, for uniform distribution, anonymity is always
preserved. Actually, in this case MobiHide behaves almost identical to
Prive´ (not shown in the graph). Anonymity is also entirely preserved for
ϑ = 0.5. As the distribution becomes more skewed, MobiHide may fail
to preserve anonymity by a small margin. In most cases, however, the
probability of identifying the query source is very close to the theoretical
bound 1/K . In the worst case, for K= 160, ϑ = 0.8, the probability of












































Figure 5.28: Anonymity Strength
Observe that in Figure 5.28(b) we did not consider CloakP2P , as it can
be easily compromised by the much simpler center-of-ASR attack. Since it






















Figure 5.29: K -ASR Area
K -ASR Size.
MobiHide wraps around the Hilbert sequence in order to handle users near
the start/end of the sequence. In some cases, this may yield K -ASRs with
larger area, compared to Prive´; consequently, the query processing cost will
increase. To investigate this issue, we considered uniform and Zipf (ϑ = 0.8)
query distributions over a set of 10K users and varying K . In Figure 5.29
we plot the average area of the K -ASRs as a percentage of the entire datas-
pace. Observe that for the Zipf distribution the two systems behave almost
identical, while for uniform distribution MobiHide generates 25% larger
K -ASRs in the worst case. Therefore, we tradeoff at most 25% in additional
query processing cost, but we obtain far superior system scalability as we
will show next.
Scalability (response time).
The most important advantage of MobiHide is its increased scalability due
to the highly decentralized structure. Here, we evaluate the response time of
the system for 1K, 5K and 10K users. The querying users are selected with
a Zipf (ϑ = 0.8) distribution7. We use exponential distribution to model the
query rate, and the mean is varied between 0.5 and 60quh (Queries per User
per Hour). Processing time at each node is exponentially distributed with












































Figure 5.30: Scalability, K = 40
mean 50ms. This is a realistic processing time that includes CPU processing
and network buffer access. We set K=40 and inject queries for a period of
600sec. From Figure 5.30(a), we can see that the response time is short (i.e,
does not exceed 5sec) even for large user populations and high query rates.
Note that the experiment assumes unbounded message queues at the nodes;
therefore the drop rate of requests is 0. We also considered bounded queues
(size = 100); in the worst case, the drop rate was 3.4%.
In Figure 5.30(b) we repeated the same experiment for Prive´. Observe
that the response time grows sharply with the query rate, due to delays
at the root node. For 10K users and 10quh the response time is almost
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600sec (whereas,MobiHide needs only 2.5sec). Again, these results are for
unbounded queues. For the bounded case (queue size = 100), the drop rate
was 26% for 8quh; for 10quh the drop rate surges as high as 60%.
5.5 Discussion
Most previous work on spatial K -anonymity assumes a centralized anonymi-
zer service architecture [33, 27, 49], whereas the only proposed distributed
anonymization system [21] provides weak privacy features, and is vulnerable
even to the simple “center-of-ASR” attack.
Our two proposed P2P anonymization infrastructures, Prive´ and Mo-
biHide, address the limitations of previous work, and remove the central
anonymizer bottleneck/single point-of-attack, while at the same time pro-
viding strong privacy and good system scalability. Our two proposed tech-
niques provide an interesting trade-off between privacy and scalability. If
theoretical guarantees on K -anonymity are required, Prive´ is the method of
choice. On the other hand, if response time is of primary importance, even
under periods of peak system load, MobiHide is the preferred technique,
with good resilience to both “center-of-ASR” and correlation attacks.
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Chapter 6
PIR Framework for LBS
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a novel approach to LBS privacy, based on Pri-
vate Information Retrieval (PIR). This is the first work that integrates loca-
tion privacy and PIR, with the following advantages over SKA approaches:
i. PIR eliminates the need for a trusted third party, whether it takes the
form of an anonymizer service, or other users. For this reason, PIR
offers much stronger privacy guarantees, and prevents attacks based
on collusion among users, which SKA is vulnerable to
ii. since PIR privacy is not dependent on other users, it eliminates the
need of expensive maintenance of the locations of a large number of
subscribed users
iii. PIR does not disclose any information about user location, not even
in perturbed (cloaked) form; location information is completely ab-
stracted, and therefore any type of location-based attack is thwarted.
In particular, PIR guarantees privacy for continuous queries
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 outlines an
existing PIR protocol for binary data, which we use as a building block in
our techniques. Section 6.3 discusses the advantages of our PIR framework,
compared to existing spatial cloaking techniques. We introduce methods




q1, q2 k/2-bit primes
N = q1 · q2 Modulus
n Number of Data Objects
m Object Size (bits)
t = d√ne PIR Matrix Dimension
M1:t,1:t[1 : m] PIR Matrix (binary array)
y1:t, array of k-bit numbers PIR Query
z1:t[1 : m], array of k-bit numbers PIR Reply
Table 6.1: Summary of notations
methods in Section 6.5. In Section 6.6, we present two optimizations tar-
geted to reduce the computational overhead of PIR. We present the results
of our experimental evaluation in Section 6.7.
6.2 Computational PIR Protocol
Computational PIR [42] relies on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption
(QRA), which states that it is computationally hard to find the quadratic
residues in modulo arithmetic of a large composite numberN = q1 ·q2, where
q1, q2 are large primes (see Table 6.1 for a summary of notations).
Define
Z∗N = {x ∈ ZN |gcd(N,x) = 1}, (6.1)
the set of numbers in ZN which are prime with N (gcd is the greatest
common divisor). Then the set of quadratic residues (QR) modulo N is
defined as:
QR = {y ∈ Z∗N |∃x ∈ Z∗N : y = x2 mod N}. (6.2)
The complement of QR with respect to Z∗N constitutes the set of quadratic
non-residues (QNR).
Let









denotes the Jacobi symbol [26]. Then, exactly half of the numbers
in Z+1N are in QR, while the other half are in QNR. According to QRA,
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for y ∈ Z+1N , it is computationally intractable to decide whether y ∈ QR
or y ∈ QNR. Formally, define the quadratic residuosity predicate QN such
that:
QN (y) = 0⇔ y ∈ QR (6.4)
Then, if q1 and q2 are k2 -bit primes, for every constant c and any function
C(y) computable in polynomial time, there exists k0 such that
∀k > k0, Pr
y∈Z+1N







Hence, the probability of distinguishing between a QR and a QNR is neg-
ligible for large-enough k.
Let t = d√n e and consider that the database X is organized as a
square t× t matrix M (the matrix is padded with extra entries if n is not a
perfect square). Let Ma,b be the matrix element corresponding to Xi that
is requested by the user u. u randomly generates modulus N (similar to a
public key in asymmetric cryptography), and sends it to the server, together
with query message y = [y1 . . . yt], such that yb ∈ QNR, and ∀j 6= b, yj ∈
QR.





where wr,j = y2j if Mr,j = 0, or yj otherwise
1. The server returns z =











a = 1 mod q2
)
(6.7)
If Equation 6.7 is true, then za ∈ QR else za ∈ QNR. Since u knows
the factorization of N , Equation 6.7 can be efficiently computed using the
Legendre symbol [26]. The user determines the value of Ma,b as follows: If
za ∈ QR then Ma,b = 0, else Ma,b = 1.
Example 6.1. Figure 6.1 shows an example, where n = 16. u requests
X10, which corresponds to M2,3. Therefore, u generates a message y =
1According to [56] the formula can be simplified as follows: wr,j = yj if Mr,j = 1,
otherwise wr,j = 1
122
X1






















y1 y2 y3 y4







i=10  a=2, b=3 
z2 QR X10=0 
z2 QNR X10=1
y1, y2, y3, y4
z1, z2, z3, z4
S
u
Figure 6.1: PIR example. u requests X10
[y1, y2, y3, y4], where y1, y2, y4 ∈ QR and y3 ∈ QNR. The server replies with
the message z = [z1, z2, z3, z4]. If z2 ∈ QR then u concludes that X10 = 0,
else X10 = 1.
The protocol requires O(n) multiplications at the server, and O(
√
n)
communication cost. The latter can be reduced to O(nε), 0 < ε < 1/2, by
applying the method recursively [42]. Although the recursive variation is
asymptotically better that the basic one, our experiments revealed that the
overhead of the recursion is not justified in practice.
The previous protocol retrieves privately one bit of information. The
same idea can be extended to retrieve an object pi which is represented as
an m-bit binary string. Let D be a database containing n objects: D =
{p1, p2, . . . pn}. Again, the server generates a matrix M with the difference
that each cell contains an m-bit object. Conceptually, this is equivalent to
maintainingmmatricesM [1],M [2], . . .M [m], one for each bit of the objects.
Assume that u requests object pi. Same as the 1-bit case, u sends a message
y = [y1 . . . yt]. However, the server applies y to each one of the m matrices,
resulting tom answer messages: z[1], z[2], . . . z[m]. u receives these messages
and computes all m bits of pi. The communication and computation cost
increase to O(m
√
n) and O(m · n), respectively. We use
PIR(pi)
to denote that a user u retrieves privately an object pi from the server, using
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the described protocol.
6.3 PIR and Location-dependent Queries
There are two privacy issues in location-dependent queries: (i) The user
must hide his identity (e.g., username, IP address, etc). This is orthogonal
to our problem and can be achieved through a widely available anonymous
web browsing service (that service does not learn the location of u). (ii)
The user must hide his location. Similar to previous research on spatial K-
anonymity (see Section 2.2), our PIR framework focuses on this issue. The
advantages of our approach are:
PIR does not disclose any spatial information. As opposed to CR-
based methods (which only perturb location, but still disclose the CR), no
location information is disclosed. Instead, the data (i.e., POIs) are retrieved
based on object index, by employing the provably private PIR protocol. This
approach prevents any type of attack based on user location. In Sections 6.4
and 6.5, we develop methods to find the NN of a user with exactly one PIR
request, irrespectively of his location.
PIR protects against correlation attacks. Assume that u asks a
continuous query as he moves. Existing methods generate one cloaking
region CRi per location, but all CRi will include u. By intersecting the set
of users in all CRi, an attacker can identify u with high probability; this is
called correlation attack. Observe that this attack is possible because the
CR reveals spatial information. Since the PIR framework does not reveal
any spatial information, u is protected against correlation attacks.
PIR reduces significantly the identification probability. Let U be
the set of all possible users (e.g., all mobile phone users within a country);
|U | is typically a large number (i.e., in the order of millions). From the
server’s point of view, the PIR request may have originated from any ui ∈ U .
Therefore, the probability to identify u as the querying user, is 1/|U |. In
contrast, existing techniques require a subset of users U ′ ⊂ U to subscribe
to the anonymization service; typically |U ′| ¿ |U |. Moreover, the number
of users in the cloaking region CR must be K ¿ |U ′|, else CR grows large
and the query cost becomes prohibitive (typically K is in the order of 102
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[39, 49]). Therefore, the probability 1/K of identifying u is several orders
of magnitude larger than that of the PIR framework.
PIR does not require any trusted third party, since privacy is
achieved through cryptographic techniques. Existing techniques, on the
other hand, need: (i) An anonymizer, which is a single point of attack, and
(ii) A large set U ′ of subscribed users, all of whom must be trustworthy, since
malicious users may collaborate to reveal the location of u. Furthermore,
users in U ′ must accept the cost of sending frequent location updates to the
anonymizer, even if they do not ask queries.
PIR reduces the number of disclosed POI. Existing SKA tech-
niques may disclose a large set of candidate POIs (see the experimental
evaluation of Section 3.6). Since the database is a valuable asset of the
LBS, users may be charged according to the result size. We will show that
PIR techniques disclose far fewer POIs.
6.4 Approximate Nearest Neighbors
In this section we describe our ApproxNN method, which employs the PIR
framework to retrieve privately the nearest point of interest (i.e., NN) of u
from a LBS. We show that a good approximation of the NN can be found
with only one PIR request. For simplicity, in Section 6.4.1 we describe our
method using the 1-D Hilbert ordering. In Section 6.4.2 we generalize to
2-D partitionings, such as kd-trees and R-trees.
6.4.1 Approximate NN using Hilbert ordering
The Hilbert space filling curve is a continuous fractal that maps the 2-D
space to 1-D. Let pi be a POI and denote its Hilbert value as H(pi). The
Hilbert ordering of a database D = {p1, p2, . . . pn} is a list of all objects
sorted in ascending order of their Hilbert values. Figure 6.2 shows an exam-
ple database with 9 POIs D = {p1, . . . p9}, where H(p1) = 6, H(p2) = 15,
etc. The granularity of the Hilbert curve is 8× 8. The granularity does not
affect the cost of our method, therefore it can be arbitrarily fine.
If two POIs are close in the 2-D space, they are likely to be close in the

































Figure 6.2: 9 POIs on a 8× 8 Hilbert curve
is the POI pi whose Hilbert value H(pi) is closest to H(u). Since the POIs
are sorted on their Hilbert value, we can use binary search to compute the
approximate NN in O(log n) steps. In our example, H(u) = 9, therefore we
retrieve p5 → p3 → p2 → p1. The answer is p1 since its distance from u in
the 1-D space is |H(p1)−H(u)| = |6− 9| = 3, which is the smallest among
all POIs. Note that the answer is approximate; the true NN is p2.
There are two problems with this approach: First, since the search must
not reveal any information, O(log n) costly private requests for PIR(pi)
must be performed. Second, a side effect of the PIR protocol is that each
PIR(pi) retrieves not one, but
√
n POIs. Recall the example of Figure 6.1,
where u is interested in X10. The server returns z1, z2, z3, z4, from which u
can compute the entire column 3 ofM , i.e., X9, X10, X11, X12. Consequently,
the binary search will retrieve O(
√
n log n) POIs, which represent a large
fraction of the database.
Observe, however, that each PIR request is intuitively analogous to a
“page access” on a disk. Therefore, the POIs can be arranged in a B+-tree,
where each node contains at most d√ne POIs. The B+-tree for our running
example is shown in Figure 6.3.a; since there are 9 POIs, the capacity of
each node is 3. Each entry in the root has a key and a pointer to a leaf. All
Hilbert values in a leaf are less or equal to the corresponding root key. Each
leaf node corresponds to one column of the PIR matrixM (see Figure 6.3.b).
Note that M stores the POIs without their Hilbert value. Without loss of




















(a) 3-way B+-tree (b) Matrix M (c) Protocol
u(9)
Figure 6.3: Approximate NN using Hilbert
Approximate NN Protocol
User u: Initiate query
Server: Send root node
User u: Let b be the column that includes u
y = [y1 : y√n], yb ∈ QNR, and ∀j 6= b, yj ∈ QR
Send y
Server: Send z[1 : m] = [z1 : z√n][1 : m]
User u: Calculate distance to all POIs in column b
Return the approximate NN
Figure 6.4: Protocol for approximate NN
more complex objects are easily supported. During query processing the
server sends to u the root node (i.e., 〈16, 33, 62〉). In the example H(u) =
9 ≤ 16, therefore u must retrieve privately the first column of M . This is
done with one request PIR({p1, p2, p3}). Next, u computes his NN from the
set {p1, p2, p3}. The answer is p2, which happens to be the exact NN. Note
that by retrieving several POIs in the neighborhood of u, the approximation
error decreases; however, the method remains approximate.
Observe that the height of the tree is always log√n n = 2. The fact that u
asks for the root node does not reveal any information to the server, since all
queries require the root. Therefore, the server sends the root, which contains
only Hilbert values but no POIs, in a low-cost plain format (i.e., does not use
PIR). Consequently, the NN is computed with only one PIR request (i.e.,
one column of M). Figure 6.4 shows the protocol. The communication cost
is O(
√
n) and u retrieves up to
√
n POIs; for instance, if the LBS contains
106 POIs, u retrieves 0.1% of them. In Section 6.7 we show that existing
methods, which employ an anonymizer, typically retrieve more POIs.
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6.4.2 Generalization to 2-D partitionings
The previous method can be extended to 2-D partitionings. The only re-





n POIs. Consider the case of kd-tree [23]. The origi-
nal insertion algorithm partitions the space either horizontally or vertically
such that every partition contains one point. We modify the algorithm as
follows: Let n′ be the number of POIs in the current partition (initially
n′ = n), and let g be the number of remaining available partitions (initially,
there are
√
n). We allow splits that create partitions e1 and e2 such that





n e ≤ g. (6.8)





n e remaining partitions respectively. Out of the eligible splits, we
choose the most balanced one.
In the example of Figure 6.5.a there are n = 9 POIs, and 3 available
buckets. The points are split into region A which contains |A| = 3 POIs
and BC which contains |BC| = 6 POIs. BC is further split into B (where
|B| = 3) and C (where |C| = 3). The resulting kd-tree has 2 levels. The
root contains regions A,B,C and the leaf level contains 3 nodes with 3 POIs
each, which are arranged in a PIR matrix M . Query processing follows the
protocol of Figure 6.4. Since u is in region C, column 3 is retrieved; the NN
is p2.
As another case study, consider the R-tree. Originally, each node would
store between f/2 and f objects, where f is the node capacity; internal nodes
contain minimum bounding rectangles (MBR) which enclose the objects of
their children. We modify the R-tree construction algorithm such that there
are 2 levels and the root contains no more than
√
n MBRs. Let n′ be the
number of POIs in the current partition. The original algorithm checks all
possible partitionings with |e1| + |e2| = n′ POIs, along the x and y-axis.
It selects the best one (e.g., lowest total area, or total perimeter, etc) and
continues recursively. We modify this algorithm to validate a split only
if Equation 6.8 is satisfied. Figure 6.5.b shows an example where MBRs
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Figure 6.5: 2-D approximate NN
A,B,C contain 3 POIs each. The leaf nodes are arranged in a PIR matrix
M and query processing follows the protocol of Figure 6.4. u is closer to
MBR B, therefore column 2 is retrieved and the NN is p2.
Both 2-D methods return the approximate NN by retrieving
√
n POIs.
The communication cost is O(
√
n). Therefore, in terms of cost, they are the
same as the Hilbert-based method. The only difference is the approximation
error, which depends on the characteristics of the dataset (e.g., density,
skew). The case studies of the kd-tree and R-tree demonstrate a general
method for accommodating any partitioning in our PIR framework. The
choice of the appropriate partitioning for a specific dataset is outside the
scope of this thesis. Note that, all variations of ApproxNN can also return
the approximate ith-Nearest Neighbor, where 1 ≤ i ≤ √n.
6.5 Exact Nearest Neighbors
In this section we present a method, called ExactNN, which returns the
POI that is the exact nearest neighbor of user u. In a preprocessing phase,
ExactNN computes the Voronoi tessellation [23] of the set of POIs (see
Figure 6.6). Every Voronoi cell contains one POI. By definition, the NN of

















A1: p2, --, --
A2: p2, --, --
A3: p1, p2, p3
...
C1: p2, p3, p4
...
D1: p4, --, --
D2: p4, --, --
D3: p4, --, --




Figure 6.6: Exact nearest neighbor
superimposes a regular G×G grid on the Voronoi diagram. Then, for every
cell c of the grid, it determines all Voronoi cells that intersect it, and adds the
corresponding POIs to c. Hence, cell c contains all potential NNs of every
location inside it. For example, Figure 6.6 depicts a 4 × 4 grid, where cell
A1 contains {p2}, cell B2 contains {p2, p3}, etc. During query processing,
u learns the granularity of the grid; therefore he can calculate the cell that
encloses his location (i.e., D2 in our example). Then, u issues a private
request PIR(D2); from the contents of D2 u finds his NN (i.e., p4).
In contrast to ApproxNN methods, the objects of the PIR matrix M of
ExactNN are not the POIs. Instead, each object in M corresponds to the
contents of an entire grid cell c. For instance, our example contains 4 POIs
(i.e., p1, p2, p3, p4), but M contains 16 objects, since there are 16 cells in
the grid. In the previous section, n (i.e., the number of objects in M) was
the same as the number of POIs. To avoid confusion, n still refers to the
number of objects in M (i.e., n = 16 in the example) and we use |POI| to
denote the number of POIs.
All objects inM must have the same number of bits, otherwise the server
may infer the requested cell based on the amount of bits transferred. Let
Pmax be the maximum number of POIs per grid cell. If a cell has fewer
than Pmax POIs, we add dummy POIs as placeholders. In our example,
Pmax = 3 because of cells A3 and C1. Therefore, all other cells are padded
with dummy POIs. For instance, cell A1 becomes {p2,−,−}. Recall from
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Exact NN Protocol
User u: Initiate query
Server: Send grid granularity G
User u: Let b be the column that includes u
y = [y1 : y√n], yb ∈ QNR, and ∀j 6= b, yj ∈ QR
Send y
Server: Send z[1 : m] = [z1 : z√n][1 : m]
User u: Let a be the row that includes u
Discard dummy POIs in za
Calculate distance to real POIs in za
Return the exact NN
Figure 6.7: Protocol for exact NN
Table 6.1 thatm denotes the number of bits of each object inM . Since there
are Pmax POIs in each object, m = |pi| · Pmax, where |pi| is the number of
bits in the representation of each POI.
Since the number of objects inM is n = G2, depending on the granularity
of the grid, nmay be larger or smaller than the number of POIs. Pmax (hence
m, too), also depends on G. Therefore the communication and computation
cost of ExactNN depend on G. In Section 6.5.1 we discuss how to select an
appropriate value for G.
The protocol for ExactNN is shown in Figure 6.7. It is similar to the
ApproxNN protocol, with one difference: Let 〈a, b〉 be the cell that con-
tains u, where a is the row and b the column. u issues a private request
PIR(〈a, b〉). Recall that, in addition to 〈a, b〉, the byproduct of this request
are the POIs of the entire column b. ApproxNN would utilize the extra POIs
to improve the approximation of the result. On the other hand, the extra
results are useless for ExactNN, since the exact NN is always in 〈a, b〉. A
possible concern is that ExactNN reveals to the user G · Pmax POIs, which
may be more than those revealed by ApproxNN. In practice, however, this
is not a problem because column b includes many duplicates. For example,
cells D1, D2, D3, D4 in Figure 6.6 all contain the same POI p4; therefore the
request PIR(D2) reveals only p4 to the user. In Section 6.6.2 we discuss an



















Figure 6.8: Finding the optimal grid granularity
6.5.1 Grid Granularity
For a particular choice of grid granularity G, the PIR protocol overhead of
ExactNN is k · G + k ·m · G communication (the first term corresponds to
request y; the second to reply z), and O(m ·G2) server computation (recall
that m = |pi| · Pmax). By increasing G (i.e., finer grid), Pmax may decrease
or remain the same, depending on the data characteristics. Figure 6.8 shows
the general form of the communication cost, as a function of G. Initially
the cost decreases fast because Pmax decreases, but later the cost increases
again at finer granularity, as Pmax reaches a lower bound (either 1, or the
maximum of duplicate POIs). We could select the value of G that minimizes
the communication cost, but there is a tradeoff, as the CPU cost increases
quadratically to G. We could include the CPU cost in the graph and find
the granularity that minimizes the total cost (expressed as response time).
This would require the exact CPU speed and network bandwidth; the latter
is problematic, since the bandwidth of each user differs. A good tradeoff is
to select the granularity Gopt near the point where the rate of decrease of
the communication cost slows down. That is the point where the slope of
the tangent of the cost function becomes −1.
In practice, since Pmax is not known in advance, the graph of Figure 6.8 is
generated as follows: First, we compute the Voronoi diagram of the dataset.
Then, we select a set of values Gi using random sampling. For each of
these values, we superimpose the resulting grid on the Voronoi diagram,
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and calculate Pmax by counting the POIs in each cell. The communication
cost is Ci(Gi) = k · Gi + k ·m · Gi . Finally, we apply curve fitting on the
〈Gi, Ci(Gi)〉 points to obtain the complete curve.
6.6 Optimizations
This section presents optimizations that are applicable to the previous meth-
ods. By employing these optimizations, the communication cost is reduced
by as much as 90%, whereas the computation cost is reduced by up to 40%
for a single CPU and more for multiple CPUs.
6.6.1 Compression
The size of z (i.e., the server’s answer) is k ·m ·r bits, where r is the number
of rows in the PIR matrix M . However, there is a lot of redundancy inside
z. Consider the example of Figure 6.6. Cells A4, B4, C4, D4 have at least
one dummy object each. Assuming that the dummy object corresponds to
bits mi . . .mj , then all z1[mi : mj ] results will be the same. Since each one
of these results is k bits, the redundancy is significant. In our implementa-
tion we use standard compression techniques to compress the result. Our
experiments showed that, in many cases, compression may save up to 90%
of the communication cost.
6.6.2 Rectangular vs. Square PIR Matrix
In the previous sections the PIR matrix M is assumed to be square. How-
ever, M can have any rectangular shape [42] with r rows and s columns (see
Figure 6.9). The shape ofM does not affect the CPU cost, since the number
of multiplications does not change. On the other hand, the communication
cost becomes: C(r, s) = k · s + k ·m · r, where the first part is the size of
the user’s request y1..s and the second part is the size of the server’s answer
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(c) M: r s
Figure 6.9: Rectangular PIR matrix M
If each object has 1 bit (i.e., m = 1), C(r, s) is minimized for r = s =
√
n (i.e., square matrix). In our ExactNN method, on the other hand,
m À 1; therefore, the communication cost is minimized for r smaller than
s. Rectangular matrices have an additional benefit: they can reduce the
number of POIs that the user learns. Consider the example of Figure 6.9.a,
where r = n and s = 1. The server returns z1..n, therefore, the user learns
n POIs. On the other hand, in Figure 6.9.b r = 1 and the server returns
only 1 POI. By using rectangular M in the ExactNN algorithm, the user
learns up to r ·Pmax POIs. This is much less than the
√
n ·Pmax POIs that
a square matrix would reveal.
Rectangular M could also reduce the communication cost in the Ap-
proxNN methods, since m À 1. However, there is a drawback: Recall that
the ApproxNN methods organize POIs in an index, whose root node is al-
ways sent to the user. The size of the root is equal to the number of columns
s. In the extreme case (i.e., for large enough m), Equation 6.9 results in
s ≈ n, therefore the root node reveals the entire database to the user, de-
feating the purpose of PIR. The minimum number of revealed POIs (i.e.,
O(
√
n)) is achieved for square M . In our implementation we use a square
matrix M for the ApproxNN methods.
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0 0 1 1 1 1
01 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
















y1 y2 y3 y4 y6y5
z1 z2 z3 z4 z6z5
y2 y3 y3 y5 y6
Execution plan
Figure 6.10: Pre-compiled optimized execution plan
6.6.3 Avoiding Redundant Multiplications
From Equation 6.6 (Section 6.2), it is clear that a PIR request requires m ·n
multiplications with yi ∈ y. Each yi is a k-bit number; to ensure that factor-
ization is hard, k needs to be in the order of hundreds. Therefore, the CPU
cost of the multiplications is high. Nevertheless, many multiplications are
redundant, since they are repeated several times. In this section we propose
an optimization technique, which employs data mining to avoid redundant
multiplications. Although in this work we only evaluate the effectiveness of
the proposed optimization for the location privacy problem, our technique
is general and can be used in other PIR applications.
By using the simplification of [56] (Section 6.2), in each row of the PIR
matrix we only need to consider the ‘1’ bits. For example, in Figure 6.10,
the result for row 1 is: z1 = y3 · y4 · y5 · y6. Observe that the partial product
y356 = y3 · y5 · y6 appears in rows 1, 2 and 4. If y356 is computed once, it can
be reused to compute z1 = y356 · y4, z2 = y356 · y1 and z4 = y356, thus saving
many multiplications. The same idea applies to y23, which appears in rows
3, 5 and 6.
Intuitively, the previous idea can be implemented as a “cache”. When a
new PIR request arrives, the server starts processing it and stores the partial
results in the cache. If a partial product is repeated, the corresponding
partial result is retrieved from the cache. Unfortunately, the number of
possible partial products is 2s, where s is the number of columns in M .
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BuildExecutionPlan
Input: transaction Ti (from row i of M),
list of frequent itemsets IT
1. ExecP lani = ∅
2. foreach itemset itj ∈ IT
3. if (¬Ti ∧ itj = 0) /*itj is part of Ti*/
4. ExecP lani = ExecP lani ∪ {itj}
5. Ti = ¬itj ∧ Ti
6. if (Ti = 0) /*no more ‘1’s in Ti*/
7. break
8. output ExecP lani
Figure 6.11: Execution plan for one row
s can be in the order of thousands, therefore the method is prohibitively
expensive for on-line use.
Observe that, although the result depends on the input y, the set of
multiplications depends only on the server’s data and is the same for any
PIR request. Therefore, similarly to pre-compiled query plans in databases,
we generate in an off-line phase an optimized execution plan that avoids
redundant multiplications. Then, during query processing, the server routes
the input y through the operators of the plan, in order to compute fast the
result z. The execution plan for our running example is shown in Figure 6.10.
In the off-line phase, we employ data mining techniques to identify re-
dundant partial products. Following the data mining terminology, each
item corresponds to one column of matrixM , whereas each transaction cor-
responds to a row of M . For example, row 1 in Figure 6.10 corresponds
to transaction T1 = 001111. A ‘1’ bit means that the corresponding item
belongs to the transaction. There are r ·m transactions with s items each.
An itemset corresponds to a partial product. In order to avoid many multi-
plications, we must identify frequent and long itemsets. We use the Apriori
algorithm [8]. Initially, Apriori considers all itemsets with one item and
prunes those that do not appear in at least fmin transactions. Then, it
considers all possible combinations with two of the remaining items and
continues recursively with itemsets containing more items.
Accessing the execution plan incurs an overhead on query execution.
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Therefore, the frequency and length of the discovered itemsets must be large
enough such that the savings from the multiplications are more than the
overhead. The cut-off values for frequency and length can be estimated by
measuring the actual multiplication time of the particular CPU. Moreover,
by decreasing fmin the running time of Apriori increases. Therefore, fmin
must be selected such that Apriori finishes within a reasonable time. Note
that the identification of frequent itemsets is a costly operation, therefore it
is not appropriate for databases with frequent updates. However, in many
LBSs updates are infrequent (e.g., hospitals change rarely). Similar to data
warehouses, our method is appropriate for batch periodic updates (e.g., once
per night).
Let IT = (it1, it2, . . .) be the list of frequent itemsets sorted in de-
scending order of itemset length. In the example of Figure 6.10, IT =
(001011, 011000) which corresponds to y356 and y23. We use the following
greedy algorithm to build the execution plan for row zi: Let Ti be the trans-
action that corresponds to zi. We traverse the list IT and select the first
(i.e., longest) itemset itj which appears in Ti. The rationale for this heuris-
tic is that longer itemsets correspond to longer partial products, hence they
are preferred for their higher potential in multiplication savings. We include
itj in the execution plan of Ti, remove from Ti all items in itj (this step is
necessary in order to ensure correctness) and repeat the process for the rest
of itemsets in IT . The pseudocode is shown in Figure 6.11 (lines 3 and 5 use
bitwise operations for performance reasons). The same process is repeated
for all rows of M .
Figure 6.12 shows the architecture of the PIR optimizer. Once a query
is received, the server checks for each row the associated execution plan
ExecP lani: for each itemset it ∈ ExecP lani, the server checks whether the
partial product of it has already been tabulated in table PROD; if so, it
is used directly, otherwise, the server computes the product and stores it
in PROD to be used for subsequent rows. The overhead of this technique
consists of the lookup in the PROD table, which can be efficiently manip-
ulated as a hash table, having as key the signature of it. The experiments
show that, by using the optimized execution plan, the computation cost is
reduced by up to 40%.
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Figure 6.12: PIR Optimizer Architecture
6.6.4 Parallelism
The PIR framework involves a large number of multiplications in a regular
pattern. Consequently, the computations can be easily parallelized. The
parallel computing infrastructure can vary from multicore CPU, to multi-
CPU to computer cluster. Matrix M is partitioned horizontally in as many
partitions as the available CPUs, and each CPU receives the corresponding
partition in an off-line phase. During query processing, all CPUs receive
the input vector y and calculate their part of the result. Communication is
minimal (only the input and output) since each partition does not depend
on the others. Therefore, parallel implementations achieve almost linear
speedup. In our experiments we used up to 8 CPUs resulting to almost 7
times faster execution time.
6.7 Experimental Evaluation
We developed a C++ prototype of the proposed PIR framework. We tested
the methods using both synthetic (uniform and Gaussian) and real (Se-
quoia2, 65K POIs in California) datasets. Our experimental testbed con-
sisted of a Pentium 4 3.0GHz machine with 2GB of RAM, running Linux OS.
2http://www.rtreeportal.org
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We employed the GMP3 library for operations with large integers (required
by PIR), and the zlib4 library for data compression. In our experiments,
we measured the communication cost, as well as the computation cost at
the server, which is the dominating factor for PIR. The CPU time includes
the compression of the result before returning it to the client (which only
accounts for a small fraction of the total CPU time). We also measured the
computation cost at the client. We varied k (i.e., modulus bits) between 256
and 1280, and the number of POIs between 10, 000 and 100, 000. Each POI
consists of its (x, y) coordinates (i.e., 64 bits).
6.7.1 1D and 2D Approximate NN
First we compare the approximate NN methods. 1D refers to the Hilbert
variant, whereas 2D refers to the R-tree variant. Figure 6.13.a shows the
server CPU time with varying k for the real Sequoia set. Recall that, for
approximate methods, n is the number of POIs. The CPU time is very
similar for both 1DApprox and 2DApprox, since in both cases it mainly
depends on the data size. CPU time varies approximately as k
√
k, which
is the average complexity of the multiplication algorithms implemented in
GMP.
Figure 6.13.b, shows the communication cost, which is linear to k. The
cost for 2DApprox is slightly lower due to compression. Compression is
more effective for 2DApprox, especially for skewed data, because the R-tree
clustering algorithms have good locality, and many POIs with similar co-
ordinates are grouped together in the same “index node” (i.e., PIR matrix
column), therefore increasing data redundancy. For k = 768, the communi-
cation cost is 1MB.
Figure 6.14.a shows the CPU time for varying data size (synthetic sets)
and k = 768. The CPU time is linear to n, since the number of multiplica-
tions is proportional to the number of ‘1’ bits in the data. The communi-
cation cost follows the expected theoretical dependency of
√
n, as shown in
















































































Figure 6.14: Variable data size, k = 768 bits
there are more POIs with nearby (possibly identical) coordinates, increasing
redundancy.
Next, we investigate the approximation error of the proposed techniques.
We generate 1000 queries originating at random locations that follow the
POI distribution (this is a reasonable assumption, since the dataset is likely
to correspond to an urban area, for instance). Given query point q, the
returned result r and actual NN p, we express the approximate NN error as
err = (dist(q, r)−dist(q, p))/maxD, wheremaxD is the side of the (square)
data space.
Figure 6.15 shows the average error for 1DApprox and 2DApprox. The
error is slightly larger for uniform data, as POIs are scattered in the entire


















Figure 6.15: Approximation Error
10K 25K 50K 75K 100K
Uniform 20x20 22x22 28x28 32x32 36x36
Gaussian 42x42 61x61 78x78 108x108 122x122
Sequoia 104x104
Table 6.2: Grid Granularity for ExactNN
is more effective, leading to better accuracy. Furthermore, the error de-
creases when data density increases. The error is always under 0.01% of the
dataspace size.
1DApprox and 2DApprox have similar CPU time and comparable com-
munication cost, since they both follow the same 2-level tree approach. The
choice between the two depends on the characteristics of the data and is
outside the scope of this work. Due to the similar performance, we only
consider 1DApprox for the rest of the experiments.
6.7.2 Exact Methods
We evaluate the performance of ExactNN in comparison with 1DApprox.
The grid size of ExactNN was determined as described in Section 6.5.1. Ta-
ble 6.2 shows the resulting grid size for each dataset. Figure 6.16.a depicts
the CPU time versus k for the real dataset. The trend is similar to ap-
proximate methods, but the absolute values are higher for ExactNN, due
to the larger size of the PIR matrix (recall that the m value for ExactNN
may be considerably larger than that for 1DApprox). In Section 6.7.3 we
evaluate methods that reduce the CPU time. Figure 6.16.b confirms that










































































Figure 6.17: Variable data size, k = 768 bits
Figure 6.17.a shows the CPU time versus the data size. Recall that n
for ExactNN depends on the grid granularity, and is not equal to the data
size. For uniform data, the number of grid cells (i.e., n value) required to
maintain a constant Pmax grows proportionally with data size, therefore the
CPU time increases linearly. On the other hand, for skewed data, in order
to maintain a value of m which provides low communication cost, it may
be necessary to use a finer grid, resulting in increased CPU time. However,
the results show that the CPU time is almost linear to the number of POI,
confirming that the heuristic for choosing the grid granularity is effective.
The good choice of granularity is also reflected in the communication cost
(Figure 6.17.b). Observe that, for Gaussian data, Pmax (hence m) increases,


































Figure 6.18: DM Optimization, Sequoia set
6.7.3 Execution Time Optimizations
In this experiment we evaluate our optimizer, which employs data mining
(DM) to reduce the CPU cost of PIR at the server. We run the Apriori
algorithm on the real dataset and retain all frequent itemsets with a support
of at least 5%. Figure 6.18 shows the results: for small k values, the gain
in execution time is less significant, because multiplications are relatively
inexpensive. However, as k increases, the benefit of avoiding redundant
multiplications becomes clear: the CPU time is reduced by up to 41% for
1DApprox, and 32% for ExactNN.
The PIR computations are suitable for parallel execution. We imple-
mented a Message Passing Interface (MPI) version of the server, and tested
it on a Linux cluster with Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz nodes. In Figure 6.19, we
show the effect of parallel processing. We vary the number of CPUs from
1 to 8; note that, since each individual CPU is slower than the one used in
the previous experiments, the 1-CPU time is slightly larger. The speed-up
obtained is almost linear for 1DApprox, where we obtained improvements
by a factor of 7.25 for 8 CPUs. For ExactNN, the speed-up is slightly lower,
up to 6.1 for 8 CPUs, because the dummy objects correspond to a lot of ‘0’
bits and result in load imbalance among the CPUs. We expect better per-
formance with a more sophisticated load-balancing algorithm. For a typical











































Figure 6.19: Parallel execution, Sequoia set
6.7.4 User CPU Time
The user is typically equipped with a slow PDA; therefore he cannot afford
expensive computations. However, our experiments show that the CPU cost
for the user is low. In Figure 6.20.a we use the real dataset and vary k. The
user needs to generate random k-bit numbers and perform QR/QNR ver-
ifications of the k-bit replies; therefore the CPU time is linear to k. For
typical k = 768, the CPU time does not exceed 0.5sec. In Figure 6.20.b we
set k = 768 and vary the data size (we use the Gaussian dataset). When
the data size increases, so does the number of columns in matrixM . Conse-
quently, the size of the query vector y , as well as the size of the reply vector
z, increases. Note that, the CPU time is lower for ExactNN, due to the use
of rectangular matrices, which reduce the size of vector z. The resulting
CPU time is always lower than 0.4sec.
6.7.5 PIR vs. Anonymizer-based Methods
We compare our methods with Hilbert Cloak (HC) [39], which offers privacy
guarantees for snapshot queries, and outperforms other cloaking-based lo-
cation privacy techniques in terms of overhead, i.e. size of cloaking region
(CR). Direct comparison is difficult, since the architectures are completely
different and there are many unknowns (e.g., how many users subscribe in
the anonymizer service, how often they update their location, how often they
ask private queries, etc). Instead we study the number of POIs that the user
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Figure 6.21: PIR vs. K-anonymity, Sequoia set
the number of retrieved POIs).
We consider the Sequoia dataset, and for HC we generate a number of
subscribed users between 1K and 128K, at locations that follow the POI
data distribution (as discussed in Section 6.7.1). Figure 6.21.a shows the
number of disclosed POI for varying number of subscribed users, and a
value of anonymity degree K of 20 (i.e., 5% probability of identifying the
source). If the number of subscribed users is low, the size of the generated
CR is large, and a huge number of POIs are included in the result. Only
for a very large number of subscribers does the POI count become com-
parable with that of 1DApprox, which is roughly 250 for the Sequoia set.
The number of disclosed POIs is even lower for ExactNN (i.e., 15 POIs in
average), due to the rectangular PIR matrix. This result shows that, in or-
der to maintain a reasonable degree of disclosed POIs (i.e., a compact CR),
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cloaking-based methods need to have a large number of subscribed users.
This translates into a high cost of location updates (mobile users change
location frequently), and also poses privacy concerns, since all users must
be trustworthy.
In Figure 6.21.b we fix the number of subscribed users to 16,000 and
vary K. HC achieves similar performance to ExactNN for K < 10, which
means that the identification probability exceeds 10%. The PIR methods
are constant because they do not need any subscribed user. Moreover the
identification probability is 1|U | ¿ 1K , where U are all possible users (see
Section 6.3).
6.8 Discussion
Our experimental evaluation shows that, although PIR techniques are rel-
atively expensive compared to usual query execution, the overhead is still
reasonable. For the real dataset and a typical value of k = 768 bits, the
communication cost for 1DApprox and ExactNN is roughly 1MB and 2MB,
respectively. The corresponding CPU time at the server is 1sec and 6sec,
respectively (by employing optimization and/or using multiple CPUs). The
CPU time at the user is 1sec at most, and the number of disclosed POIs
(hence the resulting financial cost of using the LBS), is low.
Existing SKA approaches have many hidden efficiency issues, such as
handling location updates, and managing a large number of user requests.
In addition, they have important drawbacks of qualitative nature: First,
they lack privacy guarantees for continuous queries (i.e., correlation attack),
and fail completely if some of the users are malicious. Second it may not be
commercially feasible to gather the required large number of subscribers who
will offer continuously their resources for a sporadic benefit. Third, there
may be legal reasons which prohibit the anonymizer to gather locations of
users.
Compared to previous work, the PIR framework architecture is simpler,
more secure (i.e., does not require an anonymizer or collaborating trust-
worthy users), and is the first one to protect against correlation attacks.
Nevertheless, in the absence of a parallel computing infrastructure, the com-
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putational cost incurred by PIR may be high in comparison with SKA. For
this purpose, we plan to study in future work methods to further reduce the





7.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis has focused on a comprehensive framework for private queries in
Location Based Services (LBS). We have identified the main objectives and
assumptions behind LBS query privacy, and we have systematically built
solutions that address the limitations of existing techniques. In summary,
our contributions are:
Secure SKA Algorithms. We have first considered the already estab-
lished setting in most existing work, i.e. Spatial K-anonymity (SKA) within
a centralized Anonymizer Server (AS) architecture. In Chapter 3, we have
identified the reciprocity property, a sufficient condition to guarantee SKA
for a snapshot of user locations. Our work was the first to provide privacy
guarantees in the above-mentioned setting. We have proposed two SKA
algorithms: Nearest Neighbor Cloak and Hilbert Cloak . Nearest Neighbor
Cloak uses a randomized variation of NN search, and significantly outper-
forms existing techniques in terms of K -ASR size, by a factor of up to
4 times. Hilbert Cloak builds upon the reciprocity property, and provides
provable privacy guarantees, independently of the user location distribution.
Anonymized Query Processing at LBS. The LBS overhead incurred
by the processing of anonymized queries is an important concern. In Chap-
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ter 3, we have introduced a novel algorithm for finding the NN of a circular
region, as opposed to rectangular regions which were considered previously.
We have shown that by using circular ASRs, the LBS overhead can be re-
duced by a significant margin.
SKA Reciprocity with Variable Query Frequency. We have also
considered the scenario in which a determined attacker has additional back-
ground knowledge on the query frequency of various users. In Chapter 4, we
extended the reciprocity property to account for differences in probability
of issuing a query at distinct users.
Reciprocal Framework for SKA. In Chapter 4 we have introduced a
methodology for building reciprocal ASRs in a systematic manner. We have
proposed a family of partitioning methods based on hierarchical spatial in-
dices, with various trade-offs between ASR size and generation time. The re-
ciprocal framework also addresses the variable query frequency setting. Our
AR partitioning method outperforms existing solutions by a factor of 2 in
terms of ASR size, while the proposed GH method (and its frequency-aware
counterpart) incurs an ASR generation time up to an order of magnitude
lower than competitor methods.
Decentralized LBS Query Anonymization. Motivated by the limi-
tations of the centralized AS architecture, we have considered in Chapter 5
a distributed architecture for LBS query anonymization. Users self-organize
in a P2P overlay network, and cooperate to anonymize queries. We pro-
posed two different P2P protocols, Prive´ and MobiHide, which provide a
trade-off between privacy guarantees and response time. Prive´ implements
the Hilbert Cloak algorithm in a distributed fashion and offers privacy guar-
antees. MobiHide relies on a randomized version of Hilbert Cloak , which
allows a fully-decentralized implementation on top of the Chord [57] DHT.
MobiHide guarantees privacy for uniform query distribution, and offers ex-
cellent scalability with the number of subscribed users, with a response time
of under 5 seconds in the worst case.
PIR-based LBS Privacy. Finally, in Chapter 6, we proposed a com-
pletely novel approach to LBS privacy, based on Private Information Re-
trieval (PIR). This approach has several fundamental advantages over its
SKA-based counterparts: specifically, (i) it offers strong privacy guarantees,
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that do not depend on the existence of a large number of trusted third-
parties, in the form of the AS and its subscribed users. (ii) it eliminates the
need for the maintenance of locations for a large population of mobile users
and (iii) it thwarts any type of location-based attack, as it does not disclose
any location information whatsoever to the LBS server (not even in per-
turbed form). We have also shown the benefits of PIR techniques in terms
of commercial considerations: the number of points of interest disclosed,
which is a good estimator of the financial cost incurred by LBS users, is one
order of magnitude smaller for PIR than for SKA-based techniques.
7.2 Directions for Future Research
We envision extending this research along the following directions:
• A challenging problem is to ensure anonymity for users issuing contin-
uous spatial queries. Intuitively, preserving anonymity is more difficult
in this case: asking the same query from successive locations may dis-
close the identity of the querying user, who will be included in all
ASRs. Although we have addressed this problem with our PIR ap-
proach, the issue remains open under the SKA paradigm. Our SKA
methods can be extended for processing continuous queries as follows:
a snapshot technique (e.g., NNC, HC ) is first employed to determine
the set AS of users included in the ASR for the initial snapshot of the
query; this anonymizing set is “frozen” for the rest of the query life-
time. The MBR of AS is then used as ASR at subsequent snapshots1.
However, as users move in different directions, such an approach may
yield large ASRs. Furthermore, if one of the users in AS disconnects,
it compromises the privacy of the other users. Continuous queries
involve several complex issues, and constitute a promising topic for
further work.
• Another interesting aspect to enhance the privacy offered by SKA
methods is preventing “background knowledge” attacks, when the
attacker has additional information about the preferences of certain
1Such an approach has been proposed in [20], as discussed in Chapter 2.
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users. For instance, if Bob, a rugby fan, asks for the location of the
closest rugby club, and the associated ASR contains only female users
in addition to Bob, the attacker may infer Bob as query source with
higher probability. A solution to this problem would be to group users
into partitions according to their areas of interest (e.g., users who
query frequently about restaurants, or night clubs, etc). Then, when
a query is issued, the corresponding ASR is generated with users from
the same interest group as the query source, such that each user in the
ASR has an equally likely probability of having asked the query.
• Our P2P anonymization methods currently assume a communication
network infrastructure (such as IP connectivity), where users can es-
tablish point-to-point connections. An interesting direction for future
work is to devise protocols for infrastructure-less networks, in which
only mobile devices within communication range can connect to each
other (for instance, using Wi-Fi or Bluetooth connections). Further-
more, it would be interesting to develop real-life prototypes of the
proposed decentralized anonymization systems, in order to confirm
their feasibility in practice.
• Although it offers much stronger privacy guarantees, and works under
more relaxed assumptions than SKA, our PIR LBS privacy approach
may incur increased computational and communication cost. In the
future, we plan to further investigate specific LBS privacy techniques
that result in lower cost, as well as general optimizations for PIR
protocols that would help reduce the incurred overhead.
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Appendix A
Analysis of Privacy in
Casper and Interval Cloak
Among the systems reviewed in Section 2.2, Casper and Interval Cloak per-
form spatial cloaking, using the same architecture and following the same as-
sumptions as our techniques. Next, we show formally that both approaches
are not secure. Recall that the shape of an ASR in Casper can be either a
square, or the horizontal/vertical union of two adjacent cells under the same
parent. We first analyze the case of square ASRs assuming that an attacker
detects the ASR of Figure A.1a. Then, s/he can infer that it was created
due to a query from a user U in A, B, C, D. If U is in cell A, the required
degree of anonymity KA must be in the range [MA+1, |A|+ |B|+ |C|+ |D|].
MA = |A| + max{|B|, |C|} is due to the fact that neither A ∪ B, nor
A ∪ C contains sufficient points (otherwise the ASR would be A ∪ B, or
A ∪ C). Similar to KA, we can calculate the ranges of KB, KC and KD
which have the same maximum value |A| + |B| + |C| + |D|, but different
lower bounds MB = |B| + max{|A|, |D|},MC = |C| + max{|A|, |D|} and
MD = |D|+max{|B|, |C|}, respectively.
Summarizing, the ASR is generated by a query originating from (i) A
with anonymity KA, i.e., |A| · (|A| + |B| + |C| + |D| −MA) events, or (ii)
B with KB, i.e., |B| · (|A| + |B| + |C| + |D| −MB) events, or (iii) C with
KC , i.e., |C| · (|A|+ |B|+ |C|+ |D| −MC) events, or (iv) D with KD, i.e.,
|D| · (|A| + |B| + |C| + |D| −MD) events. The total number of events is
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(|A|+ |B|+ |C|+ |D|)/2−|A| ·MA−|B| ·MB−|C| ·MC−|D| ·MD. Given no
additional knowledge about the query frequency and the anonymity degree
distributions, the attacker considers that these events have equal probabil-
ities. For instance, s/he assumes that the query originates from A with
probability:
PA =
|A| · (|A|+ |B|+ |C|+ |D| −MA)
(|A|+ |B|+ |C|+ |D|)2 − |A| ·MA − |B| ·MB − |C| ·MC − |B| ·MD
(A.1)
Within A, each individual user can issue the query with equal probability
PA/|A|. For SKA to be preserved, it must hold that PA/|A| ≤ 1/KA.
Since the maximum value of KA is |A|+ |B|+ |C|+ |D|, we have PA/|A| ≤
1/(|A|+|B|+|C|+|D|). Applying the same reasoning to PB/|B|, PC/|C| and
PD/|D| and some algebraic simplifications, we derive the following system
of linear inequalities:
MA =
|B| ·MB + |C| ·MC + |D| ·MD
|B|+ |C|+ |D| (A.2)
MB =
|A| ·MA + |C| ·MC + |D| ·MD
|A|+ |C|+ |D| (A.3)
MC =
|A| ·MA + |B| ·MB + |D| ·MD
|A|+ |B|+ |D| (A.4)
MD =
|A| ·MA + |B| ·MB + |C| ·MC
|A|+ |B|+ |C| (A.5)
The solution to the above system has the only form MA =MB =MC =
MD. MA = MD implies that |A| = |D|, and MB = MC that |B| = |C|. In
other words, each pair of diagonal cells should have the same cardinality;
otherwise Casper fails to preserve SKA. As an example consider Figure
A.1a, where A, C and D contain one user each, and B includes 10 users
(MA = MB = MD = 11, MC = 2). Assuming that the query originates
from UC in cell C, then KC must be in the range [3, 13]. The attacker will
infer UC as the origin with probability PC/|C| = 11/35, which exceeds 1/KC
for KC ≥ 4. Thus, the anonymity of UC is breached for all, but one, queries
involving this ASR.
Having established that the diagonal neighbors must have the same car-
dinality (in order not to compromise square ASRs), we will show that the










(a) Square ASR (b) 2x1  Rectangular  ASR
Figure A.1: Examples of Casper ASRs
Assume a rectangular ASR consisting of cells A and B as shown in Figure
A.1b. Clearly, the query may have originated from a user U in A or B.
If U is in A, the required degree of anonymity KA must be in the range
[|A|+1, |A|+ |B|]. This is because if KA ≤ |A|, the ASR would not include
B (as the points in A would suffice). Otherwise, if KA > |A| + |B|, the
ASR should be larger than the union of A and B. Similarly, if the query
is issued by any user from B, the degree of anonymity KB is in the range
[|B|+ 1, |A|+ |B|].
The ASR is generated by (i) a query originating from A with KA, i.e.,
|A|·|B| events, or (ii) a query originating fromB withKB, i.e., |B|·|A| events.
Given that these events have equal probabilities, the attacker assumes that
the query originates from A or B with PA = PB = |A| · |B|/(2 · |A| · |B|) =
1/2. Within A or B, each individual user can issue the query with equal
probability PA/|A| = 1/(2 · |A|) or PB/|B| = 1/(2 · |B|), respectively. SKA
requires that PA/|A| ≤ 1/KA and PB/|B| ≤ 1/KB. Because the maximum
value of KA and KB is |A|+ |B|, it must hold that 1/(2 · |A|) ≤ 1/(|A|+ |B|),
and 1/(2 · |B|) ≤ 1/(|A|+ |B|), which are simultaneously satisfied only when
|A| = |B|. In case that |A| 6= |B|, Casper fails to preserve SKA. For instance,
in Figure A.1b (|A| = |D| = 5, |B| = |C| = 10), assume that the ASR is
generated due to a query from UA with KA in [6, 15]. The attacker will
pinpoint UA with probability PA/|A| = 1/10, which compromises anonymity
for all values of KA in the range [11, 15].
In conclusion, Casper achieves SKA only when each cell (at any level)
contains exactly the same number of users as its neighbors, i.e., only for
perfectly uniform user distribution. The analysis of Interval Cloak is similar
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to Casper; except that (i) the ASR is always square, and (ii) MA = |A|,
MB = |B|, MC = |C| and MD = |D|, because if a cell does not contain
enough users, the method uses directly its parent. Thus, the previous system
of inequalities implies that in order to guarantee anonymity, it should hold
that |A| = |B| = |C| = |D|, meaning that Interval Cloak is also applicable
only to uniform datasets.
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